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REDLAND SOCCER CLUB, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY:
THE RECOVERY OF MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS
UNDER HSCA's CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania produces fifty million
tons of hazardous waste each year.1 To deter careless or haphazard
1. See BuREAu OF LAND RECYCLING & WASTE MANAGEMENT, PENNSYLVANIA DE-
PARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 7, PENNSYLVANIA HAZARDOUS WASTE FA-
CILITIES PLAN (1997). Pennsylvania's recurrent waste generation in 1995 totaled
approximately 49.7 million tons. See id. at 9. "Recurrent waste" refers to waste that
is consistently produced year after year. See id, at 8.
Estimates indicate that the number of hazardous waste sites in the United
States "could eventually reach 500,000, an average of 10,000 sites per state." PaulJ.
Komyatte, Medical Monitoring Damages: An Evolution of Environmental Tort Law, 23
COLO. L. REv. 1533 (1994). Currently, eighty percent of Americans live near a
hazardous waste site. See GLOBAL ToMoRRow COALITION, THE GLOBAL ECOLOGY
HANDBOOK 248 (Walter H. Corson ed., 1990) (citing Council on Economic Priori-
ties statistics). Tortious conduct is responsible for much of individuals' contact
with hazardous substances. See Ann Taylor, Comment, Public Health Funds: The Next
Step in the Evolution of Tort Law, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AnF. L. REv. 753, 753 & n.4 (1994).
Section 103 of the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA) defines "hazardous
substance" and "hazardous waste." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.103 (West
1993) [hereinafter HSCA]. HSCA defines "hazardous substance[s]" as substances
designated as hazardous under either the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA),
1980 Pub. L. 380, No. 97, or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq., as well as a
substance whose release, or a threatened release, poses a substantial threat to the
public health, not including any petroleum products. See HSCA, § 6020.103 (de-
fining "hazardous waste" as "[a] ny waste defined as hazardous under the act ofJuly
7, 1980 (Pub. L. 380, No. 97), known as the Solid Waste Management Act, and any
regulations promulgated under the act").
SWMA defines hazardous waste as follows:
Any garbage, refuse, sludge from an industrial or other waste water treat-
ment plant, sludge from a water supply treatment plant, or air pollution
control facility and other discarded material including solid, liquid, semi-
solid or contained gaseous material resulting from municipal, commer-
cial, industrial, institutional, mining, or agricultural operations, and from
community activities, or any combination of the above, (but does not in-
clude solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are
point sources subject to permits under § 402 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, as amended (86 Stat. 880) or source, special nuclear, or
by - product material as defined by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (68 Stat. 923), which because of its quantity, concentration, or
physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may:
(1) cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an in-
crease in morbidity in either an individual or the total population; or
(2) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, dis-
posed of or otherwise managed.
(201)
1
Stevens: Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army: The Recovery
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
202 VIt.iu ovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRAL [Vol. X: p. 201
management of that waste, the Pennsylvania General Assembly en-
acted the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA).2 HSCA authorizes
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
to compel regulated entities to comply with the provisions of
The term "Hazardous Waste" shall not include coal refuse as defined in
the act of September 24, 1968 (Pub. L. 1040, No. 318), known as the
"Coal Refuse Disposal Control Act." "Hazardous Waste" shall not include
treatment sludge from coal mine drainage treatment plants, disposal of
which is being carried on pursuant to and in compliance with a valid
permit issued pursuant to the act of June 22, 1937 (Pub. L. 1987, No.
394), known as "The Clean Streams Law." P.A. Stat. 35, P.S. § 6018.103.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.103 (West 1993).
CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (Oct. 17, 1986) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675), gives the federal government broad authority to provide for
the cleanup of hazardous substance sites. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1992). Section 104(a) of CERCLA authorizes
the President to respond to a release, or a threatened release, of hazardous sub-
stances by undertaking removal and remedial action, or any other response action
deemed necessary to protect the public health or welfare, not inconsistent with the
National Contingency Plan, which prescribes methods for undertaking response
actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a); 40 C.F.R. Part 300; see also Alcan, 964 F.2d at 258.
The President delegated CERCLA response authority for Department of Defense
facilities to the Secretary of Defense, with the Environmental Protection Agency
having final cleanup authority. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923
(1987); 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e) (4) (A).
CERCLA section 10 7 (a) imposes liability on "responsible persons" for a re-
lease, or a threatened release, of a hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C. § 9601. Under
CERCLA, both private parties as well as the federal government can be liable as
responsible persons. See id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(21), 9607. Regarding
the scope of liability, CERCLA provides that a responsible person shall be liable
for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan ...
(C) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id. § 107(a) (4) (A), (B) & (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) & (D).
2. See HSCA, § 6020. The Pennsylvania General Assembly found that "im-
proper disposal... [of hazardous substances] pose [s] a real and substantial threat
to the public health and welfare of the residents of [Pennsylvania]." Id. § 102(2).
For the most recent information regarding HSCA, including information on the
most current annual report, fact sheets, HSCA site list and remedial sites status, see
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Homepage (last modi-
fied Feb. 18, 1998) <http://www.dep.state.pa.us/default.htm>.
2
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HSCA.3 Like many other Pennsylvania environmental statutes, 4
HSCA contains a citizen suit provision. 5 This provision enables pri-
3. See HSCA, § 6020.301. In the "Declaration of Policy" section of HSCA, the
General Assembly stated:
Many of the hazardous sites in this Commonwealth which do not qualify
for cleanup under the Federal Superfund Act pose a substantial threat to
the public health and environment. Therefore, an independent site
cleanup program is necessary to promptly address the problem of hazard-
ous substance releases in this Commonwealth, whether or not these sites
qualify for cleanup under the Federal Superfund Act.
Id. § 102(8). The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) is
responsible for implementing HSCA's "independent site cleanup program." Id.
§ 301. DEP has the power and duty to "[d]evelop, administer and enforce a pro-
gram to provide for the investigation, assessment and cleanup of hazardous sites in
this Commonwealth pursuant to the provisions of this act and regulations adopted
under this act." Id.
4. There are numerous Pennsylvania environmental statutes authorizing citi-
zen suits. The following is a non-exhaustive list: Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.1115 (West 1993); Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 691.601 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); Penn-
sylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.1305
(West 1993); Pennsylvania Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduc-
tion Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.1711 (West 1974 & Supp. 1997); Penn-
sylvania Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4013.6 (West 1993);
Pennsylvania Storm Water Management Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 680.15 (West
1993); Pennsylvania Flood Plain Management Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 679.502(b) (West 1993); Pennsylvania Safe Drinking Water Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 721.13(b) (West 1993); Pennsylvania Phosphate Detergent Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 723. 1 3(g) (West 1993); Pennsylvania Surface Mining Conservation
and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.21 (West 1974); Pennsylvania
Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1396.21 (West 1974); Pennsylvania Coal Refuse Disposal Control Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, § 30.63 (West 1974); Pennsylvania Non-Coal Surface Mining Conserva-
tion and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 3320 (West 1974); Pennsylvania
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7130.508 (West
1993). These citizen suit provisions share many general concepts including: 1)
similar remedies, 2) parties subject to suit, 3) who may bring suit, 4) what, if any,
prior notice is necessary, and 5) cost shifting. See Michael M. Meloy et al., Environ-
mental Private Rights of Action in Pennsylvania, 875 PA. BAR INST. 27-32 (1994) [here-
inafter PA. BAR INST.].
5. See HSCA, § 6020.1115. The "Citizen Suit" provision of HSCA, section
1115, provides:
(a) General rule. - A person who has experienced or is threatened with
personal injury or property damage as a result of a release of a haz-
ardous substance may file a civil action against any person to prevent
or abate a violation of this act or of any order, regulation, standard or
approval issued under this act.
(b) Jurisdiction. - The courts of common pleas shall have jurisdiction
over any actions authorized under this section. No action may be
commenced under this section prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has
given notice to the department, to the host municipality and to the
alleged violator of this act- or of any regulations or orders of the
department under this act; nor may such action be commenced
when the department has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil or criminal action in a court of the United States or a state to
require compliance with the statute, permit, standard, regulation,
1999]
3
Stevens: Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army: The Recovery
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
204 ViLLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. X: p. 201
vate individuals to compel regulated entities to comply with HSCA's
provisions when DEP is either unwilling or unable to do so. 6
condition, requirement, prohibition or order. In any such civil ac-
tion commenced by the department, any person may intervene as a
plaintiff as a matter of right. The court may grant any equitable re-
lief; may impose a civil penalty under section 1104; and may award
litigation costs, including reasonable attorney and witness fees, to the
prevailing or substantially prevailing party whenever the court deter-
mines such an award is appropriate.
Id. § 6020.1115(b).
6. See HSCA, § 6020.1115(b). HSCA's "Scope of Liability" provision, section
701 (a), defines the class of regulated entities as follows:
(a) General Rule. - Except for releases of hazardous substances ex-
pressly and specifically approved under a valid Federal or State per-
mit, a person shall be responsible for a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance from a site when any of the following apply:
(1) The person owns or operates the site:
(i) when a hazardous substance is placed or comes to be located
in or on a site;
(ii) when a hazardous substance is located in or on the site, but
before it is released; or
(iii) during the time of the release or threatened release.
(2) The person generates, owns or possesses a hazardous substance
and arranges by contract, agreement or otherwise for the dispo-
sal, treatment or transport for disposal or treatment of the haz-
ardous substance.
(3) The person accepts hazardous substances for transport to dispo-
sal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person from which there is a release or a threatened release
of a hazardous substance which causes the incurrence of re-
sponse costs.
Id. § 701(a).
Citizen suits perform an important function in the implementation and en-
forcement of many of Pennsylvania's environmental statutes. See PA. BAR INST.,
supra note 4, at 27-32 (commenting that because many of Pennsylvania's environ-
mental statutes contain citizen suits provisions, those provisions are vital to en-
forcement of environmental regulations). Citizen suit provisions are primarily a
mechanism through which private individuals may compel regulated entities to
comply with state and federal statutes when the government either lacks significant
funds or is unwilling to do so. See id. Individuals' ability to bring suit ensures
protection of the general public's interest in a safe and clean environment. See id.;
see a/soJean Buo-lin Chen Fung, KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig: The Merits and Impli-
cations of Awarding Restitution to Citizen Plaintiffs Under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B), 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 828 (1995) (commenting that citizen suits' most widely ac-
knowledged purpose is to enable private citizens to influence and direct enforce-
ment of state and federal statutes). Thus, private individuals are able to act as
"private attorneys general" in the enforcement of Pennsylvania's statutes. PA. BAR
INST., supra note 4, at 27-32. See also, Fung, supra, at 828-29 (describing citizen suits
as allowing private individuals to act as private attorneys general); JAMES T. BLANCH
et al., CITIZEN SUITS AND Qui TAm ACrIONS: PRIvATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC POL-
icy 1 (1996) [hereinafter QuI TAM ACTIONS] (stating that "[c]itizen suits are in-
tended to be actions by 'private attorneys general' - that is, lawsuits brought in
the public interest by citizens seeking to vindicate important national priorities").
For a discussion of citizen suits as a critical tool for the enforcement of environ-
mental legislation, see generally Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, Citizen Suits: Impacts
on Permitting and Agency Enforcement, 11 NAT. RES. J. No. 4, 20, 23-25 (Spring 1997).
4
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Until recently, private individuals rarely invoked HSCA's citi-
zen suit provision. 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army,8 however, promises
to generate new interest in this provision.9 In Redland, the supreme
court held that HSCA's citizen suit provision authorizes private in-
dividuals to assert claims for medical monitoring. 10 A claim for
medical monitoring allows a private individual to seek recovery for
the costs of periodic medical examinations conducted to detect
physical injury that may result from contact with a hazardous sub-
stance."1 From a plaintiff's perspective, a claim for medical moni-
As a legislatively created right of action, the prerequisites to bringing citizen
suits and the remedies available thereunder are specifically prescribed and limited.
See PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 27-32. See alsoJohn M. Hyson and John P. Judge,
A Comparative Analysis of the Federal and Pennsylvania Superfund Acts, 1 VILL. ENVL.
LJ. 1, 100-02 (1990) (comparing citizen suit provisions of HSCA and CERCLA).
Accordingly, the specific terms of the statutory provisions under which a citizen
brings suit are of paramount importance in defining the scope of the action. See
PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 27-32.
7. Individuals have rarely litigated the scope of HSCA's citizen suit provision.
See PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 27-28. This is largely because individuals may
appeal DEP actions directly to the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB). See
HSCA, § 6020.1102(d). EHB is an independent quasi-judicial agency whose sole
function is to review orders, permits, licenses and decisions. See id. §§ 7513-14.
Thus, because EHB provides almost immediate access and heightened familiarity
with the provisions of HSCA, most appeals have been traditionally funneled
through EHB. See PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 27-28. Individuals seeking redress
of injuries not attributable to DEP actions, such as a common law claim for medi-
cal monitoring, may not appeal to EHB but instead must seek judicial resolution of
their claims. See HSCA, § 7514.
8. 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997).
9. See id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Redland decision did not affect
Pennsylvania residents' ability to assert claims for medical monitoring under com-
mon law. See HSCA, § 6020.1107 (section 1107 provides: "[n]othing contained in
this act shall abridge or alter rights of action or remedies at law or equity"). A
medical monitoring claim under HSCA's citizen suit provision, however, incorpo-
rates additional incentives such as the element of strict liability and attorneys' fees.
See id §§ 702, 1115. For a discussion of the elements of both a common law and
HSCA claim for medical monitoring, see infra notes 105-13 and accompanying
text.
10. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 144-45. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision in Redland, see infra notes 82-116 and accompanying
text.
11. See generally American Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Toxic Torts:
Proposals for Compensating Victims of Hazardous Substances, Legislative Analysis, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter AEI Analysis]. For a complete discussion of
medical monitoring claims, see infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
While there is some evidence that courts may permit recovery for medical
monitoring in the context of various injuries such as those resulting from automo-
bile accidents, this Note will concentrate on medical monitoring in the environ-
mental tort context - by far the most common use of medical monitoring claims.
See Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 847 P.2d 574 (5th Dist. 1993) (noting plaintiffs most
often assert medical monitoring claims in environmental context).
1999]
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toring under HSCA's citizen suit provision combines the powerful
incentives of strict liability with the potential for recovery of attor-
ney fees. 12 While plaintiffs exposed to hazardous substances in
Pennsylvania may still recover medical monitoring under the com-
mon law, a suit initiated under HSCA's citizen suit provision is now
the easiest and most cost-effective means through which private in-
dividuals may recover medical monitoring damages.15
This Note analyzes HSCA's provision authorizing claims for
medical monitoring. First, Part II defines medical monitoring
claims and examines HSCA's policy goals and its legislative history
14
with an emphasis on the language of HSCA's "citizen suit" and
"scope of liability" provisions. 15 Further, Part II discusses the ap-
proaches that state and federal courts have taken pursuant to
claims for medical monitoring.16 Next, Part III outlines the facts of
Redland.17 Then, Part IV considers the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's holding and reasoning in Redland.i8 Part V then critically
analyzes the supreme court's determination that private individuals
may assert claims for medical monitoring under HSCA's citizen suit
12. See HSCA, §§ 6020.702, 1115. Section 702(a) holds persons responsible
for a release of hazardous substances strictly liable for the ensuing response costs.
See i&L § 702(a). Section 1115(b) permits the recovery of attorney fees to the pre-
vailing or substantially prevailing party. See id. § 1115(b). For the text of
§ 1115(b), see supra note 5.
13. See it, § 1107.
Because Pennsylvania recognizes medical monitoring as a valid common law
cause of action, plaintiffs that have been exposed to hazardous substances are not
required to pursue their claim under HSCA. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 146. For a
discussion of the Redland court's test for establishing a medical monitoring claim,
including the court's requirement that a medical monitoring claim under HSCA
prove negligence, see infra notes 105-12.
14. For a discussion of HSCA's policy goals, see infra notes 29-31 and accom-
panying text. For an analysis of HSCA's legislative history, see infra notes 32-39
and accompanying text.
15. For an examination of HSCA's citizen suit provision, section 1115, see
infra note 33 and accompanying text. For an examination of HSCA's scope of
liability provision, section 702, see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of state courts' decisions regarding claims for medical
monitoring, see infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
federal courts' decisions regarding medical monitoring claims, see infra notes 60-
70 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the facts of Redland, see infra notes 71-81 and accompa-
nying text.
18. For an examination of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding and
reasoning in Redland, see infra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
6
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provision. 19 Finally, Part VI. considers the implications and effects
of the supreme court's decision in Redland.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. Medical Monitoring
In asserting a claim for medical monitoring, a private individ-
ual seeks to recover the cost of future periodic medical examina-
tions intended to facilitate early detection and treatment of diseases
resulting from exposure to hazardous substances.2' Because mod-
ern toxins tend to cause injuries which are not fully apparent at the
time of exposure, preventative monitoring is especially important
in toxic exposure cases. 22 Traditionally, individuals have pled medi-
19. For a critical analysis of the Redland decision, see infra notes 117-48 and
accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the impact of the Redland decision, see infra notes 149-
55 and accompanying text.
21. See generally AEI Analysis, supra note 11; Myrton F. Beeler & Robert Sap-
penfield, Medical Monitoring What is it, How Can it Be Improved?, 87 AM. J. CLINICAL
PATHOLOGY 285 (1987) (commenting that medical monitoring is process in which
periodic medical examinations are conducted to monitor changes in patient's con-
dition); Albert Wong, Note, Medical Monitoring in a Toxic Age, 2 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
2 (1986) (asserting individuals exposed to toxic substances are entitled to medical
monitoring to both determine whether that exposure will adversely impact them as
well as reduce severity of harm caused by exposure). See also Potter v. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821 (Cal. 1993) (commenting that in context
of toxic exposure case for medical monitoring seeks cost of future periodic medi-
cal examinations intended to result in early detection and treatment of disease
caused by plaintiffs exposure to possible toxins).
Medical monitoring, as a remedy, has four principal benefits including: (1)
public health interest in encouraging and fostering access to early medical testing
for those exposed to hazardous substances; (2) possible economic savings realized
by the early detection and treatment of the disease; (3) deterrence for polluters;
and (4) elemental justice. SeeAllen L. Schwartz, Annotation, Recovery of Damagesfor
Expense of Medical Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R.
FED. 5TH 327, § 2 (1994); see also Allan Kanner, Medical Monitoring Remedies, C855
ALI-ABA 737, 740-41 (1993). In asserting medical monitoring claims, individuals
seek to recover the actual costs of the tests they must undergo to detect possible
latent injuries. See Schwartz, supra, at § 2.
22. See Mark A. Tanner, Note, Torts - Medical Monitoring Trusts: A Win-Win
Situation Under FELA? Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 33 LAND &
WATER L. Rxv. 399 (1998) (commenting that "[a] llowing injured plaintiffs prevent-
ative medical monitoring should result in a decrease in costs to tortfeasors, insur-
ance companies, and government programs since medical conditions will be
detected and treated at the earliest and most cost effective stage in their develop-
ment"); 2 A.L.I. 375, Enterprise Responsibility of Personal Injury, (1991) (discussing
difficulties toxic injury plaintiffs face due to latent nature of their injuries); Allan
T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensa-
tion of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. LJ. 849, 850 (1988) (stating medical monitoring
provides otherwise healthy individuals with preventative medical treatment in
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cal monitoring claims as one element of legal damages, an in-
dependent tort, or a form of equitable relief.2 3 Debate exists
among courts regarding whether claims should proceed at law or at
equity.2 4 In some jurisdictions, if a court awards damages in one
23. See Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without The Cat: Claims For Damages From
Toxic Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARYJ. ENVrL. L. 285, 293 (1994)
(commenting that different forms of medical monitoring claims exist because
medical monitoring developed from several different theoretical roots including
traditional tort, legal damages and equitable remedies).
24. See Carol E. Dinkins et al., Overview: Recent Trends and Developments in Envi-
ronmental and Toxic Tort Litigation, SB73 ALI-ABA 261, 280 (1997) (commenting
that although courts have occasionally awarded money damages for estimated cost
of medical monitoring, they have often established funds through which they di-
rectly provide necessary medical services); Akim F. Czmus, M.D., Medical Monitoring
of Toxic Torts, 13 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 35, 36 (1994) (stating courts' re-
sponses to claims for medical monitoring costs may be "considered either an equi-
table remedy for exposure to a toxic substance or ... a form of damages").
One scholar opines that if a court characterizes a remedy as punitive, then it
should award a plaintiff a lump-sum recovery. See George W.C. McCarter, Medical
Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Liti-
gation, 45 RurGERS L. REV. 227, 253-54 (1993) (proposing damages courts award in
medical monitoring cases may be classified as either at law or equity, depending on
courts' determination of remedy's purpose). In contrast, another commentator
argues that if a court recognizes recovery as a means of facilitating public health or
policy, it should look toward fashioning equitable remedies. See Wells, supra note
23, at 294 (asserting court supervised funds are solely useful in context of rough
estimates of damages).
One reason courts encounter difficulty in determining whether to award re-
covery at law or at equity is that individuals asserting medical monitoring claims
are required to demonstrate neither current harm resulting from exposure to
toxic substances nor even the likelihood of developing a disease in the future. See
Anthony R. Laratta and Brian S. Paszamant, Comment, Diagnosing Medical Monitor-
ing Costs Under CERCLA: Checking for a Pulse, 7 ViLL. ENvrL. L.J. 81, 107 (1996).
Plaintiffs need only show that medical monitoring would decrease the likelihood
of their developing a disease. See id.
In the majority of jurisdictions that have recognized medical monitoring,
these costs have been viewed as an element of damages under traditional common
law tort theories. See Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921, at
*15 (D.C. Super. Aug. 18, 1997) (holding medical monitoring claims are requests
for damages, not requests for injunctions); Harding v. Tambrands Inc., 165 F.R.D.
623, 632 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding certification of class action seeking injunctive
relief in form of medical monitoring of alleged victims of toxic shock syndrome
resulting from plaintiffs' use of defendants' tampon products was inappropriate
because plaintiffs sought primarily money damages as relief); Boughton v. Cotter
Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing certification of class action sought on basis of claims for in-
junctive relief concerning medical monitoring of alleged victims of exposure to
hazardous emissions in light of fact that plaintiffs sought primarily money damages
as relief); Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1400, 1403-04 (W.D. Mo.
1994) (finding plaintiffs' request for future medical monitoring costs was insuffi-
cient basis for certification of plaintiff class in action alleging corporation's con-
tamination of groundwater because those damages were mere element of tort
damages and did not constitute injunctive relief).
A few states have awarded medical monitoring costs pursuant to a recognized
cause of action or independent tort, rather than as a claim for damages. See, e.g.,
[Vol. X: p. 201
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lump sum, the action is at law; or, conversely, if a court places the
funds in a court supervised account, the action is at equity.25 Other
Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the Army, 835 F. Supp. 803, 809 (M.D. Pa.
1993) (common law of Pennsylvania recognized tort of medical monitoring); In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Hansen v.
Mountain Fuel Supp., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993) (holding Utah common law rec-
ognizes claim for medical monitoring). Other courts have held that claims for
medical monitoring are equivalent to injunctions and thus equitable in nature. See
Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 876 F. Supp. 475, 479 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding court-administered fund that exceeded payment of costs of monitoring
individual plaintiffs health to establish pooled resources for early detection and
advances in treatment of disease was injunctive in nature rather than predomi-
nantly money damages); Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 845 F. Supp. 705 (D. Ariz.
1993) (holding that "[p]laintiffs' request for court-supervised program requiring
ongoing, elaborate medical monitoring of members of class exposed to contami-
nated groundwater qualified as injunctive relief"); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
151 F.R.D. 378 (D.C. Colo. 1993) (finding that "[r]equest for medical monitoring
of residents exposed to weapons production facility's release of radioactive and
non-radioactive substances presented request for injunctive relief").
The following jurisdictions do not allow plaintiffs to recover the cost of medi-
cal monitoring (defined as the need for periodic medical testing for possible, fu-
ture disease) but do allow plaintiffs to recover present medical expenses if they are
able to demonstrate a present injury. See Kentucky: Bocook v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,
819 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (applying Kentucky law); Maryland: Wright v.
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 565 A.2d 377 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Missouri:
Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (applying
Missouri law); North Carolina: Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL
312969 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990); Virginia and West Virginia: Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co.,
755 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.W. Va. 1990) (applying law of Virginia and West Virginia);
and the territory of the Virgin Islands: Purjet v. Hess Oil Virgin Island Corp., No.
1985/284, 1986 WL 1200 (D.V.I. Jan. 8, 1986).
25. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 288-91 (N.J. 1987). The
New Jersey Supreme Court was one of the earliest jurisdictions to advocate the
court supervised fund. See id. In Ayers, the residents ofJackson brought a nuisance
action against the township alleging that toxins from their town's landfill contami-
nated their water. See id. at 291. The plaintiffs sought a medical monitoring trust
fund to pay for periodic medical examinations to determine whether their contact
with the contaminated water would produce latent injuries. See id. The Ayers court
stated:
In our view, the use of a court-supervised fund to administer medical-
surveillance payments in mass exposure cases.. . is a highly appropriate
exercise of the Court's equitable powers .... Such a mechanism offers
significant advantages over a lump-sum verdict .... [A] fund would serve
to limit the liability of defendants to the amount of expenses actually in-
curred. A lump-sum verdict attempts to estimate future expenses, but
cannot predict the amounts that actually will be expended for medical
purposes. Although conventional damage awards do not restrict plain-
tiffs in the use of money paid as compensatory damages, mass-exposure
toxic-tort cases involve public interests not present in conventional tort
litigation. The public health interest is served by a fund mechanism that
encourages regular medical monitoring for victims of toxic exposure ....
Although there may be administrative and procedural questions in the
establishment and operation of such a fund, we encourage its use by trial
courts in managing mass-exposure cases . . . . [M]edical-surveillance
damages will be paid only to compensate for medical examinations and
tests actually administered, and will encourage plaintiffs to safeguard
2091999]
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jurisdictions view either of these two methods of awarding medical
monitoring damages to be a form of legal damages.26
B. HSCA
1. Declaration of Policy
The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed HSCA to protect
the health and welfare of Pennsylvania residents from the improper
disposal of hazardous waste. 27 After considering past responses to
hazardous waste disposal in Pennsylvania, the General Assembly
concluded that "traditional remedies were inadequate."28 Regard-
their health by not allowing them the option of spending the money for
other purposes.
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314 (citations omitted). See also Hansen v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 982 (Utah 1993) (adopting court administered fund
approach).
26. See Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 895 (D. Minn. 1990) (find-
ing claim for medical monitoring to be claim for money damages). In Werlein, the
court stated:
the medical monitoring fund proposed by the plaintiffs simply is not an
injunctive remedy. Plaintiffs propose that defendants be forced to pay a
lump sum of cash into a fund, and that persons eligible for medical moni-
toring use that pot of cash to obtain reimbursement costs incurred as the
result of medical screening examinations. Payment of cash by one party to
reimburse other parties for costs incurred is not injunctive relief
Id. (emphasis added). See also Mertens v. Abbott Lab., 99 F.R.D. 38 (D.N.H. 1983)
(holding medical monitoring not injunctive relief); Jaffee v. United States, 592
F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 1979) (asserting plaintiff cannot transform claim for dam-
ages into equitable action by asking for injunction that orders payment of money);
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 552 (E.D. La. 1995) (declining
to certify plaintiffs' claims for medical monitoring of diseases related to exposure
to tobacco under Rule 23(b) (2) because plaintiffs were primarily seeking mone-
tary damages not equitable relief). See also Richard P. Campbell and Michelle I.
Schaffer, Requests for Class Action Certification of Medical Monitoring Claims, 63 DEF.
COUNS.J. 26, 31 (1996) (commenting most courts conclude that medical monitor-
ing relief is simply compensation for necessary medical expenses plaintiffs reason-
ably anticipate they will incur and therefore classify those costs as item of
damages); Allen Kanner, Environmental and Toxic Tort Issues, AMER. L. INST. (1995)
(damages refer to amount of monetary compensation responsible party owes for
property damage and personal injury and this award is different from punitive
damages which are to punish and deter wrongdoing, and from equitable remedies
such as injunctions).
27. See HSCA, § 6020.102(2). The Pennsylvania General Assembly declared
that citizens have a right to clean water and a healthy environment, and that the
General Assembly is responsible for ensuring protection of that right. See id.
§ 102(1). To fulfill that responsibility, the General Assembly sought to create an
independent site cleanup program to promptly and comprehensively address the
problem of hazardous waste releases in Pennsylvania. See id. § 102(8).
28. Id. § 102(5). Traditional remedies were ineffective in preventing the re-
lease of hazardous substances, specifying the obligations of persons responsible for
the release and identifying new remedies to protect the citizens of Pennsylvania.
See id. The General Assembly further stated that "[t]raditional methods of admin-
istrative and judicial review have interfered with responses to the release of hazard-
10
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less of whether the waste disposal sites qualified for cleanup under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 29 the General Assembly deemed "ex-
traordinary enforcement remedies" necessary to encourage the
clean-up of hazardous sites in a manner that would promote the
public health and safety of Pennsylvania's citizens. 30
2. The Statute and Its Legislative History
HSCA is silent regarding private individuals' recovery for medi-
cal monitoring in both section 1115, its "Citizen Suit" provision, 31
ous substances into the environment .... It is, therefore, necessary to provide a
special procedure which will postpone both administrative and judicial review until
after the completion of the response action." Id. § 102(6). The General Assembly
also acknowledged the following:
[m] any of the hazardous sites in [Pennsylvania] which do not qualify for
cleanup under the Federal Superfund Act pose a substantial threat to the
public health and environment . . . . Therefore, an independent site
cleanup program is necessary to promptly and comprehensively address
the problem of hazardous substance releases in this Commonwealth,
whether or not these sites qualify for cleanup under the Federal
Superfund Act.
Id. § 102(8). The General Assembly did not provide a more specific indication of
particular "traditional legal remedies" it found to be inadequate. See id. § 102.
29. See HSCA, § 102(7). See generally, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., The Role of State
"Little Superfunds" in Allocation and Indemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 5 ViLL. ENVrL. L.J. 83, 94 (1994)
[hereinafter Little Superfunds] (observing HSCA closely parallels provisions of CER-
CLA); Hyson, supra note 6, at 3 (commenting although modeled after CERCLA,
HSCA contains modified policy considerations).
30. See HSCA, § 102(9). Section 102(9) provides, "[e]xtraordinary enforce-
ment remedies and procedures are necessary and appropriate to encourage re-
sponsible persons to clean up hazardous sites and to deter persons in possession of
hazardous substances from careless or haphazard management." Id.
31. For the text of section 1115(a), see supra note 5. Citizen suits rarely allow
recovery for private injuries. See generally, Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Re-
source Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
851, 870 (1989) (stating that "[b]ecause [citizen suits] involve citizens vindicating
public rights, they are different from private causes of action for harm to plaintiffs
personally. They thus do not include toxic tort suits for personal injury or prop-
erty damage [because of plaintiffs status as a private attorney general]."); PA. BAR
INST., supra note 4, at 1 (stating that citizen suits are not designed to redress private
grievances and that remedies in citizen suits are generally in form of injunctions,
costs and attorneys fees, and occasionally, civil penalties); Shay S. Scott, Combining
Environmental Citizen Suits and Other Private Theories of Recovery, 8 J. ENVTL. L. &
LrnG. 369, 377-78 (1993) (noting that citizen suit provisions almost never provide
for recovery of damages, but instead provide for injunctive relief, costs and attor-
neys fees, and occasionally, civil penalties which are paid to government).
There are, however, instances in which a citizen suit may benefit the public
only in a general way while directly forwarding a private party's goals. See PA. BAR
INST., supra note 4, at 3. For instance, one commentator notes that in federal citi-
zen suits, "while penalties assessed must go to the federal treasury and citizen
plaintiffs are not entitled to sue for damages, courts generally have been liberal
about allowing settlements to include 'supplemental environmental projects
1999]
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and section 702, its "Scope of Liability" provision.3 2 Although sec-
(SEPs)."' Id. at 21. SEPs are payments derived from settlements with alleged viola-
tors of environmental statutes. See id. In light of the severe sanctions that courts
often levy in large cases, and because plaintiffs can expect no personal economic
gain, they will often opt for settlement in the form of SEPs rather than endure
extensive litigation. See id. See also Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, Citizen Suits: Im-
pacts on Pennitting and Agency Enforcement, 11 NAT. RESOURCES J. No. 4, 20, 21
(Spring 1997) (noting although private parties cannot sue for damages, courts
have generally been liberal about allowing settlements to include "supplemental
environmental projects," which can include payments to environmental groups
and projects). For an example of a Pennsylvania citizen suit that does permit the
recovery of private damages, see infra note 123.
Rather than provide for private recovery, citizen suits are a vehicle for private
enforcement of public rights. See PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 1. They are pri-
marily a mechanism through which private individuals may compel regulated enti-
ties to comply with state and federal statutes when the government is unwilling or
unable to pursue the action. See id. These goals are also reflected in Penn-
sylvania's citizen suits provisions. See supra note 7. For example, there are a
number of Pennsylvania citizen suit provisions that forbid private enforcement
when DEP is actively involved in prosecuting the case. See PA. BAR INST., supra note
4, at 31. HSCA has an identical limitation. See HSCA, § 6020.1115(b). Under
HSCA, section 1115(b), "[n]o action may be commenced under this section prior
to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice to the department... nor may such
action be commenced when the department has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting [in order to] require compliance with the statute . . . ." Id. The sixty
day notice period provides DEP time to investigate the site at issue and decide
whether to prosecute. See id. As section 1115 (b) demonstrates, DEP is the primary
enforcer of HSCA. See id. A private individual brings a citizen suit only when DEP
is unwilling or unable to do so. See id. Thus, while DEP requires "compliance with
the statute," a private individual is powerless to bring suit. See id.
Nevertheless, a citizen may intervene as a matter of right in a DEP prosecution
in the interest of protecting his stake in the litigation. See id. This allows third
parties to challenge permits, approvals, orders and decisions that DEP may have
granted. See PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 28. Similarly, even if an individual
brings a citizen suit after the sixty day period, DEP may also intervene as a matter
of right and consequently relieve the private individual of prosecutorial duties. See
HSCA, § 6020.1115(c).
32. See HSCA, § 6020.702. The "Scope of Liability" provision of HSCA, sec-
tion 702, provides in relevant part:
(a) General rule. - A person who is responsible for a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from a site as specified
in section 701 is strictly liable for the following response costs and
damages which result from the release or threatened release or to
which the release or threatened release significantly contributes:
(1) Costs of interim response which are reasonable in light of the
information available to the department at the time the interim
response was taken.
(2) Reasonable and necessary or appropriate costs of remedial re-
sponse incurred by the United States, the Commonwealth or a
political subdivision.
(3) Other reasonable and necessary or appropriate costs of response
incurred by any other person.
(4) Damages for injury to, destruction of or loss of natural resources
within this Commonwealth or belonging to, managed by, con-
trolled by or appertaining to the United States, the Common-
wealth or a political subdivision. This paragraph includes the
[Vol. X: p. 201
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tion 702 does provide that responsible persons are liable for the
cost of a "health assessment or health effects study, '3 3 HSCA does
not specifically define the term "health assessment. '34 HSCA's leg-
islative history is similarly silent regarding recovery for medical
reasonable costs of assessing injury, destruction or loss resulting
from such a release.
(5) The cost of a health assessment or health effects study ....
Id.
33. Id. Caselaw does not indicate courts' interpretation of "health assessment
or health effects study." Id. One district court that considered the issue decided
the case without addressing the term's meaning. See Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725
F. Supp. 258, 263-65 (M.D. Pa. 1989). In Lutz, the plaintiffs sought to recover costs
for "medical surveillance" under HSCA. See id. The court did not reach the issue
of whether those damages were available because it found that there exists no pri-
vate cause of action under HSCA. See id. Research fails to reveal any other re-
ported case where plaintiffs sought medical monitoring damages under HSCA. See
generally, Little Superfunds, supra note 29, at 92-96; Hyson, supra note 6, at 97-100.
Moreover, courts' interpretations of whether the "person" in 702(a) refers to
private individuals have varied. HSCA defines "person" as:
An individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, authority, interstate body or other legal
entity which is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties. The
term includes the Federal Government, state governments and political
subdivisions.
HSCA, § 6020.103. Although the inclusion of "individual" as a component of
HSCA's definition of "person" suggests that private persons may bring suits under
section 702, courts' interpretations of this section have varied. See generally, Hyson,
supra note 6, at 103 (commenting although section 702 does provide that responsi-
ble persons are liable for response costs "incurred by any other person," as no
provision of HSCA creates private right of action in which such "other person" may
recover his response costs, such right of action might be implied as it was under
CERCLA). See, e.g., PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 36.
To clarify, section 507(a) provides that responsible parties or a person who
(1) causes a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, (2) violates an
order of DEP or (3) causes a release of non-hazardous waste to which DEP re-
sponds under its emergency response authority are liable for the resulting re-
sponse costs and natural resource damages. See HSCA, § 6020.507(a). Section 701
then delineates which persons are responsible for response costs under HSCA. See
id. § 701. Finally, section 702 provides the scope of costs that are recoverable as
.response costs." See id. § 702.
34. See HSCA, § 6020. While HSCA does not define "health assessments,"
CERCLA's definition may be instructive. CERCLA defines "health assessments" as
including:
preliminary assessments of the potential risk to human health posed by
individual sites and facilities, based on such factors as the nature and ex-
tent of contamination, the existence of potential pathways of human ex-
posure . . . the size and potential susceptibility of the community within
the likely pathways of exposure, the comparison of expected human ex-
posure levels to the short-term and long-term health effects associated
with identified hazardous substances and any available recommended ex-
posure or tolerance limits for such hazardous substances, and the com-
parison of existing morbidity and mortality data on diseases that may be
associated with the observed levels of exposure.
CERCLA § 9604(i) (6) (F).
1999]
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monitoring.3 5 It does, however, indicate some discussion among
the General Assembly concerning recovery for personal injury
under HSCA.36 Although the version of HSCA the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives originally passed included a private cause
of action for personal injury recovery,3 7 the final version of HSCA
did not contain such a provision.38
35. See H.B. 1852-3428, at 41-42, Printer's No. 3428, § 509. One federal court
has noted that the legislative history of HSCA is not as exhaustive as that of its
federal counterpart CERCLA. See Toole v. Gould, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 985, 994
(M.D. Pa. 1991). In commenting on HSCA's legislative history, the Toole court
proposed that the general lack of definitive legislative history concerning many
statutes is the result of no one person being responsible for the passage of state
legislation. See id. With this in mind, legislative intent, which one may discem to a
degree from a statute's legislative history, is only one factor in determining the
proper meaning of a statute. See id.; see generally Remarks of Rep. Manderino 61
House Legislative Journal 1718 (stating that "[w] hile virtually everyone has sup-
ported a State hazardous waste cleanup program, the approaches taken by various
interest groups were varied, and often they were divergent").
36. See H.B. 1852-3428, at 41-42, Printer's No. 3428, § 509. [37 House Legisla-
tive Journal at 991-1039]. The House of Representatives passed the following ver-
sion of the bill on June 7, 1988:
Private Cause of Action.
Any person responsible for a release of a hazardous substance under this
act shall also be strictly liable for any personal injury or property damage
resulting from the release or for any response costs incurred which are
not inconsistent with a departmental action pursuant to section 505.
Id.
HSCA section 505 outlines the development and implementation of response
actions Department of Environmental Resources of Pennsylvania has taken. See
HSCA, § 6020.505.
37. See id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not comment on this part of
the legislative history of HSCA. See generally Redland, 696 A.2d at 137.
38. See HSCA, § 6020. The Senate Environmental and Energy Resources
Committee deleted section 509. See H.B. 1852, Printer's No. 3558. At least one
court has considered the deletion of this provision as persuasive evidence for deny-
ing plaintiffs a private cause of action under HSCA. See Lutz v. Chromatex, 730 F.
Supp. 1328, 1332 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (holding HSCA does not provide private cause
of action). But see General Elec. Envtl. Servs. v. Envirotech, Corp., 763 F. Supp.
113, 117 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (noting section 509's deletion is attributable to existence
of section 702(a) (3), which permits private right of action); Smith v. Weaver, 665
A.2d 1215, 1217-19 (1995) (holding private right of action exists under HSCA).
Unfortunately, HSCA's legislative history does not include the rationale support-
ing that deletion. See generally Toole, 764 F. Supp. 985 (acknowledging lack of legis-
lative history noting that only time private right of action was explicitly proposed, it
was stricken from bill).
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C. Medical Monitoring in State Courts
Historically, plaintiffs exposed to hazardous substances exper-
ienced frustration when bringing claims for medical monitoring.39
These plaintiffs faced the difficult task of proving the existence of a
recoverable injury. 40 Injuries stemming from exposure to hazard-
ous substances generally produce latent injuries that individuals
may not detect for many years. 41 One way in which plaintiffs en-
joyed a limited measure of success was by asserting claims based on
39. See generally Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969,
at *51 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990); Rheingold v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, No. 74 Civ.
3420, Memorandum Op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975); Potter v. Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 896 (Ct. App. 1990); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
Some states and circuits, nevertheless, have begun to accept claims for medi-
cal monitoring. See generally Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319
(5th Cir. 1986); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1986);
Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1507 (l1th Cir. 1985);
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 824-26
(D.C. Cir. 1984); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 711 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 503 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1985); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1983); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1984).
40. See Czmus, supra note 24, at 37 (highlighting plaintiffs' inability to ascer-
tain precise dollar amounts and levels of exposure to toxins as difficulties plaintiffs
encounter in their attempts to establish claims for medical monitoring); Slagel,
supra note 22, at 860 (finding individuals' inability to illustrate particular level of
increased risk of disease resulting from exposure to hazardous substances); Kath-
leen A. O'Nan, Note, The Challenge of Latent Physical Effects of Toxic Substances: The
Next Step in the Evolution of Toxic Torts, 7 J. MIN. L. & POL'y 227, 238 (1991-92)
(noting courts' hesitancy to recognize claims for increased risk of disease in toxic
tort cases). Cf Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases:
Another Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs, 33 Hous. L. REv. 473 (1996) (commenting
plaintiffs have had little success with enhanced risk claims, but have had greater
success with claims based on fear of disease).
41. SeeJordan, supra note 40, at 475. One commentator notes:
[t]here is typically a long latency period between exposure and the ap-
pearance of health effects. The effects are rare and may be characterized
as "nonsignature" diseases. In other words, not everyone exposed to a
toxic chemical will become sick, and those who do may not be aware that
the illness results from the exposure. In addition, it may be impossible to
reconstruct which chemical (if any) caused the illness or when the expo-
sure occurred.
John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and
Toxic Substances Contro4 91 COLUM. L. Ruv., 261, 264 (1991). For a discussion of the
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their enhanced risk of future injury.42 These claims generally failed
because plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate actual injuries. 43
A Pennsylvania court refused to require plaintiffs to demon-
strate an actual injury for the first time in Habitants Against Landfill
Toxicants v. City of York. 44 The Habitants court held that where a
plaintiff is at risk of contracting a serious latent disease, but is un-
able to establish a present injury, he can maintain a common law
claim in equity for medical monitoring. 45 Other courts have recog-
42. See generally Morrison v. Fibreboard, 428 Pa. Super. 114 (1993). Claims
based on fear of enhanced risk of future disease allow plaintiffs to recover for
mental anguish and does not require expert testimony. See Edward J. Schoen et
al., Could Cancerphobia Become a New Plaintiffs'Medical Malpractice Gold Mine ?, 12 No.
1 HEALTHSPAN 8, 9 (1995). Courts have feared that recognition of enhanced risk
claims would permit juries to impermissibly speculate as to the injuries that would
stem from plaintiff's exposure to toxins. See Morrison, 428 Pa. Super. at 117-18.
Some commentators have called the increased risk cause of action itself a
"phantom remedy" because of the difficulty of proving causation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. See William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability
for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HoFsTRA L. REV. 859 (1981).
43. See generally Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
Morrison, 630 A.2d at 437-38; Higginbotham v. Fibreboard Corp., 630 A.2d 14, 15-
16 (1993); Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., 612 A.2d 1021 (1992); Martin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088 (1985); Addams v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No.
1340 C.D. 1988, slip op. at 16 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Mercer County, July 30, 1993); see
also Kimberly V. Rest, Note, Fear of Cancer: Pennsylvania's Temporary Respite From In-
adequate Compensation for Victims of Asbestos Exposure, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
319, 323 (1994) (commenting demonstration of actual injury has traditionally
been prerequisite to plaintiffs' recovery of damages). Not all states, however, have
abandoned the claim of enhanced risk of future harm. See generally Bryson v. Pills-
bury Co., 573 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. App. 1998) (holding that to establish claim
based on increased risk of future harm plaintiff must present evidence that 1)
increased risk of future harm is more likely than not to occur and 2) plaintiff has
not claimed overly speculative damages).
44. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20937 (Pa. Com. P1. 1985). In Habitants Against Landfill
Toxicants v. City of York, the plaintiffs alleged injuries from toxic chemicals that had
leaked into their property from a neighboring landfill. See id. at 20937. The plain-
tiffs requested that the court establish a $1,000,000 trust fund to monitor and de-
tect all future medical problems the landfill might cause. See id. The plaintiffs also
requested an injunction requiring defendants to abate the nuisance, trespass and
threat to the public health that the site's hazardous substances posed. See id. In
granting the medical monitoring trust fund, the court characterized the action as
in equity and denied the plaintiffs attorneys' fees because there existed no statu-
tory basis for their provision. See id. The court rejected the defendant's conten-
tion that it should not grant equitable relief in the form of a trust fund because
there existed an adequate remedy at law. See id. The defendant argued the rem-
edy available at law was a future lawsuit, which plaintiffs could bring if, and when,
actual damages became apparent. See id. The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment, however, by noting the difficult legal barriers that the plaintiffs would face if
the court forced them to bring a future, rather than present, action. See id.
45. See id. at 20939. The court noted that "if plaintiffs are deprived of any
necessary diagnostic services in the future because they have no source of funds
available to pay for the testing, the consequences may result in serious, if not fatal
illness." Id. at 20938.
[Vol. X: p. 201
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nized the injustice of requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate actual
physical injury as a prerequisite to recovery and consequently devel-
oped the tort remedy of "medical monitoring. '46 Several jurisdic-
tions have permitted claims for medical monitoring as a separate
cause of action rather than as a claim for damages. 47 The majority
of courts, however, have allowed medical monitoring costs as an
element of damages under traditional common law tort theories.48
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a decision that other courts
have widely accepted, adopted medical monitoring as a distinct
cause of action at law in Ayers v. Township of Jackson.49 The Ayers
46. The earliest mention of medical monitoring was in Morrissy v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), when the court stated that "possible
future damages in a personal injury action are not compensable unless reasonably
certain to occur." Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 896
(Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 863 P.2d 795 (1993) (citing Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394
N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)). The next occurrence of medical monitoring was
Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244, 247 (App. Div. 1984).
For lists of jurisdictions that have recognized some form of medical monitor-
ing, as well as a list of states that have rejected medical monitoring outright, see
supra note 24.
47. See Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the Army, 835 F. Supp. 803,
809 (M.D. Pa. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995); In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1990); Hansen v. Moun-
tain Fuel Supp. Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).
48. See generally Alabama: Cain v. Armstrong World Indus., 785 F. Supp 1448
(S.D. Ala. 1992); Arizona: Bums v.Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App.
1988); California: Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993);
Colorado: Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1991); District
of Columbia: Friends for All Children Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d
816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Florida: Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985); Guam: Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 1064 (1994); Illinois: Betts v. Manville Personal Injury Settlement
Trust, 588 N.E.2d 1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Indiana: Gray v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 624 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Kansas: Burton v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Kan. 1995); Kentucky: Bocook v. Ashland Oil
Inc., 819 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.W. Va. 1993); Louisiana: Johnson v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 645 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. La. 1986); Michigan: Meyerhoffv. Turner Constr. Co.,
534 N.W.2d 204 (Mich. App. 1995); Minnesota: Werlein v. United States, 746 F.
Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990); Missouri: Thomas, 846 F. Supp. 1400; NewJersey: Ayers
v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); New York: Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 876 F. Supp. 475 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); North Carolina: Smith v.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 425 S.E.2d 719 (1993); Ohio: Day, 851 F. Supp. 869;
Pennsylvania: Jones v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990);
Tennessee: Denton v. Southern Ry. Co., 854 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993);
Utah: Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993); Vermont:
Stead v. F.E. Myers Co., 785 F. Supp. 56 (D. Vt. 1990).
49. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). State supreme courts that have explicitly ac-
knowledged the NewJersey Supreme Court's guidance include: Pennsylvania, Red-
land Soccer Club v. Department of Army, 696 A.2d 137 (1997); Utah, Hansen v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (1993); California, Potter v. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821 (Cal. 1993). Lower courts have also recog-
nized Ayers'influence regarding subsequent medical monitoring claims. See gener-
ally Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., 1997 WL 538921, Aug. 18, 1997 (D.C. Super.);
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court emphasized the distinction between plaintiffs' recovery for
their enhanced risk of injury and their claims for medical monitor-
ing.50 Under Ayers, whereas in asserting a claim based on enhanced
risk of future injury a plaintiff seeks damages based on an unquan-
tifiable degree of injury to the plaintiffs health and life expectancy,
a medical monitoring claim allows for compensation of the actual
costs of periodic medical testing.51 Thus, the Ayers decision entitled
the plaintiffs therein to recover for the economic injury suffered as a
result of having to undergo periodic medical examinations, costs
they would not have incurred absent their exposure to hazardous
substances. 52
Notably, the Utah Supreme Court embraced the Ayers rationale
when it decided Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.5 3 Although it
Meyerhoff v. Turner Construction Co., 509 N.W.2d 847 (Mich. Super. 1993); Ger-
ardi v. Nuclear Util. Servs. Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1991).
50. See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 303. The court stated:
[t]he enhanced risk claim seeks a damage award, not because of any ex-
penditure of funds, but because plaintiffs contend that the unquantified
injury to their health and life expectancy should be presently compensa-
ble, even though no evidence of disease is manifest .... By contrast, the
claim for medical surveillance does not seek compensation for an un-
quantifiable injury, but rather seeks specific monetary damages measured
by the cost of periodic medical examinations.
Id. at 304.
51. See id. at 303. The recovery in medical monitoring cases is for the economic
harm that plaintiffs incur as a result of being forced to submit to periodic medical
testing. See id. For a discussion of the difficulty plaintiffs in enhanced risk of fu-
ture injury cases encounter in proving causation and damages, see Ellen Relkin,
Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Actions, BIEF at 48 (Spring 1992) (comment-
ing on difficulty confronting plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate causation and
damages because of latent nature of injuries). See also Keith W. Lapeze, Comment,
Recovery for Increased Risk of Disease in Louisiana, 58 LA. L. REv. 249 (1997) (noting
difficulty in proving increased risk of future disease when invisible carcinogenic
material has entered human body); Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy
of Special Masters: Administrative Agencies for the Courts, 2-FALL WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
235, 243 (1997) (commenting that evidence to support claims for enhanced risk of
future injury often require complex probability determinations, epidemiological
studies, statistical analysis and medical evidence); Janet H. Smith, Increasing Fear of
Future Injury Claims: Where Speculation Carries the Day, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 547, 553
(1997) (noting that standard of proof in increased risk of future injury claims can
be more probable than not, reasonably certain, reasonably probable, medically
probable, probability or reasonable medical certainty).
52. See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 304.
53. 858 P.2d 970 (1993). In Hanson v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., the plaintiff
argued that his exposure to asbestos entitled him to periodic medical testing to
facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of diseases stemming from his exposure.
See id. at 976. The defendant countered by asserting plaintiff's inability to demon-
strate that he required anything other than routine maintenance. See id.
In support of its holding that the plaintiff was entitled to the costs of periodic
medical testing, the Utah Supreme Court cited two common law principles: (1)
the "doctrine of avoidable consequences," which required the plaintiff to either
submit to medical treatment or risk extinguishment of his right to recover future
18
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acknowledged the need to compensate plaintiffs for the costs asso-
ciated with periodic medical testing that Ayers highlighted, the Han-
sen court formulated its own test for a cause of action after it
declined to accept the specific elements the Ayers court enumer-
ated.54 Other states' high courts, including Pennsylvania's, have
similarly embraced actions for medical monitoring.55
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined for the first time
in Simmons v. Pacor whether a private individual may assert a claim
for medical monitoring.56 After rejecting the enhanced risk ap-
proach, the Simmons court cited the non-speculative nature of medi-
cal monitoring as the legal basis for a valid course of action.57
Nevertheless, because the plaintiff in Simmons did not request medi-
damages, and (2) the rule permitting a plaintiff to recover damages stemming
from a demonstrated injury. See id The Utah Supreme Court rejected the defend-
ant's argument to allow medical monitoring in only those cases where the plaintiff
demonstrated actual, and present, physical injury and instead held that the plain-
tiffs exposure itself combined with his resulting need for medical testing consti-
tutes the injury. See id. at 977.
54. See id. In Utah, to recover for medical monitoring, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) exposure;
(2) to a toxic substance;
(3) which exposure was caused by the defendant's negligence;
(4) resulting in the increased risk;
(5) of a serious disease, illness, or injury;
(6) for which early detection is beneficial; meaning that a treatment ex-
ists that can alter the course of the illness;
(7) and which test has been prescribed by a qualified physician accord-
ing to contemporary scientific principles.
See id. at 979.
55. See generally Pennsylvania: Redland Soccer Club v. Department of Army,
696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997); Connecticut: Doe v. Stamford, 699 A.2d 52 (1997); Ari-
zona: Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 936 P.2d 1274 (1997); Utah: Hansen v. Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (1993); California: Potter v. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821 (Cal. 1993); NewJersey: Ayers, 525 A.2d 287. But see
Michigan: Sarrach v. Turner Constr. Co., 562 N.W.2d 781 (1997).
56. 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996). In Simmons v. Pacor, the plaintiff was exposed to
asbestos while serving with the United States Navy. See id. at 232-36. The plaintiff
developed asymptomatic pleural thickening, a condition that does not impair an
individual's ability to lead an active, normal life. See id. at 236. Based on its finding
that plaintiff suffered no actual injury, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
asymptomatic pleural thickening is not a compensable injury that gives rise to a
cause of action. See id at 237. Nevertheless, the court did recognize an exception
regarding damages for expenses a plaintiff may incur in his medical surveillance of
the condition. See id at 239. The supreme court later stated in Redland that its
holding in Simmons was not limited to asbestos cases. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 145.
The Redland court commented that the non-speculative nature of a claim for medi-
cal monitoring supported its decision to permit a common law claim for medical
monitoring. See id.
57. See Simmons, 674 A.2d at 236 & 240 n.11.
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cal monitoring as a form of relief, the court did not specify the
elements that comprise a medical monitoring claim. 58
D. The Third Circuit's Treatment of Medical Monitoring Claims
in Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately rejected the ele-
ments for medical monitoring these courts utilized and instead
adopted a test that has its genesis in several Third Circuit deci-
sions.5 9 The first time the Third Circuit examined a Pennsylvania
common law claim for medical monitoring was in In re Paoli Rail-
road Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli 1).60 Noting that neither the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court nor the Pennsylvania Superior Court had
ever addressed this issue, the Third Circuit predicted that the
supreme court would permit individuals to assert a claim for medi-
cal monitoring.61 After distinguishing a claim for medical monitor-
58. See id. at 240. In reaching its decision, the Simmons court acknowledged
that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit predicted that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would allow, in certain cases, recovery for medical
monitoring. See id. at 239 (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d
Cir. 1990) (Paoli I) (recognizing claim for medical monitoring where plaintiffs
were exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) found in railcar transformers);
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (Paoli II) (holding
medical monitoring claim viable under Pennsylvania law)). The court also ex-
amined the rationale articulated by the Court of Appeals of Arizona in Burns v.
Jaquays Mining Corp. and found it to apply to its own analysis. See id. (citing Burns
v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (1987) (holding plaintiffs are entitled to
customary medical testing and evaluation despite absence of physical manifesta-
tion of asbestos-related diseases)).
59. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 145 (agreeing with reasoning supporting both
New Jersey as well as Utah Supreme Courts' tests regarding medical monitoring,
but declining verbatim adoption of either state's test).
60. See Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 848. In Paoli I, the Third Circuit addressed a Penn-
sylvania common law claim for medical monitoring. See id. at 836. The Paoli I
plaintiffs sought medical monitoring damages in response to their prolonged ex-
posure to poly-chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). See id. at 835. They also sought re-
covery for property damages and response costs under CERCLA. See id. The Third
Circuit remanded the case so that the plaintiffs could present their evidence in a
manner consistent with the Third Circuit's test. See id. at 862. For the text of the
Paoli I test, see infra note 63. For a discussion of Paoli I, see generally, Noel C. Birle,
Note, Toxic Torts - Evidence - Third Circuit Recognizes Medical Monitoring Tort and
Makes Significant Rulings Concerning Expert Testimony in Toxic Torts Cases, 37 ViLL. L.
Rev. 1174 (1994) [hereinafter Toxic Torts].
61. See Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 849. In support of its conclusion, the Third Circuit
noted that as a federal court sitting in diversity, it had to predict whether the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court would recognize a claim for medical monitoring under
the substantive law of Pennsylvania and, if so, what elements it would entail. See id.
(citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The Third Circuit also
acknowledged that one Pennsylvania trial court had allowed a similar claim to pro-
ceed. See id. at 849 n.20 (citing Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants v. City of
York, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20937 (1985)). The Third Circuit then highlighted a differ-
ent Pennsylvania trial court's denial of a similar claim. See id. at 849 n.20 (citing
20
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ing from a claim of enhanced risk of harm, the Third Circuit
concluded that a medical monitoring claim involves none of the
speculation that is inherent in a claim based on enhanced risk.
6 2
The Third Circuit then outlined a test it believed the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would employ in determining whether a plaintiff
had established a claim for medical monitoring.
63
The Third Circuit further examined the Pennsylvania common
law position regarding medical monitoring claims in In re Paoli Rail-
road Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli I1).64 The court amended the test it
Peterman v. Techalloy Co., Inc., 29 Pa. D & C.3d 104 (Mont. Co. 1982)). The
Third Circuit rejected Peterman on the grounds that the plaintiffs therein had re-
quested a medical monitoring trust fund, as opposed to damages for specific medi-
cal surveillance costs, which the Third Circuit presumed would also include the
costs of future medical treatment, instead of solely medical surveillance. See id.
62. See id. at 850-51. The Third Circuit characterized an action for medical
monitoring as an effort to recover only the quantifiable costs of periodic medical
examinations that are necessary to detect an injury. See id. at 850. Differently, the
court noted, the goal of an enhanced risk claim is compensation for the antici-
pated harm itself, proportionally reduced to reflect the chance that it will not oc-
cur. See id. An enhanced risk claim, the court continued, is inherently speculative
because it forces courts to anticipate the probability of future injury. See id.; see also
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 297-313 (N.J. 1987) (discussing dis-
tinction between recovery for enhanced risk of contracting serious illness and
claim for medical monitoring, concluding preference for latter). But see Kristen
Chapin, Comment, Toxic Torts, Public Health Data, and the Evolving Common Law:
Compensation for Increased Risk of Future Injury, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVrL. L. 129, 141 (1993) (highlighting benefits of claims based on enhanced risk
of future injury, including compensating plaintiffs prior to development of disease,
increasing public awareness of neighborhood toxins, promoting accountability
and deterring individuals from engaging in dangerous activities).
63. See Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 852. The Third Circuit presented the following test
in Paoli I to determine whether a plaintiff establishes a claim for medical
monitoring:
(1) Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance
through the negligent actions of the defendant;
(2) As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly in-
creased risk of contracting a serious latent disease;
(3) That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations
reasonably necessary; and
(4) Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early detec-
tion and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial.
Id.
64. See Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 787. In Paoli II, the Third Circuit addressed the
defendant's claims that Pennsylvania courts' decisions subsequent to Paoli I had
undercut that court's conclusion that a common law claim for medical monitoring
was viable in Pennsylvania. See id. at 785-86. Noting that although some Penn-
sylvania courts' actions since Paoli I had cast doubt on whether the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would accept a claim for medical monitoring, the Third Circuit
refused to overrule Paoli I absent definitive guidance from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. See id. at 786. The Paoli H/court also addressed the district court's
holding that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to support their med-
ical monitoring claim. See id. The Third Circuit then concluded that medical
monitoring was still a viable claim in Pennsylvania and that the plaintiffs, in fact,
1999]
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outlined in Paoli Iwith the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate
a need for "special medical monitoring."65 "Special medical moni-
toring" is a medical monitoring regime that differs from commonly
recommended medical examinations due to plaintiffs exposure to
hazardous substances. 66
In the Redland federal action, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its
adherence to the element of "special monitoring."67 Although a
common law claim for medical monitoring was not at issue,68 the
had presented sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment on
their claim. See id.
For a discussion of the caselaw the Third Circuit considered in Paoli II in reaf-
firming its position that Pennsylvania common law recognized a common law
claim for medical monitoring, see Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 785-86.
65. Id. at 788. For a discussion of the "special medical monitoring" require-
ment, see infra notes 111-15.
66. See id. The Third Circuit relied primarily on the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Hansen v. CCI Mechanical, Inc. in formulating its "special medical moni-
toring" requirement. See 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993). The Hansen court stated that
to demonstrate significant exposure to a proven hazardous substance, (element
(1) of the Paoli I test), a plaintiff must:
prove that by reason of the exposure to the toxic substance caused by the
defendant's negligence, a reasonable physician would prescribe for her
or him a monitoring regime different than the one that would have been prescribed
in the absence of that particular exposure. This is because under this cause of
action, a plaintiff may recover only if the defendant's wrongful act in-
creased the plaintiffs incremental risk of incurring the harm produced
by the toxic substance enough to warrant a change in the medical moni-
toring that otherwise would be prescribed for that plaintiff.
Id. at 980 (emphasis added).
67. Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir.
1995). The plaintiffs in the Redland federal action filed their action for medical
monitoring under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), CERCLA and HSCA. See
id. at 829. Regarding the claim the plaintiffs brought pursuant to FTCA, the Third
Circuit held that the plaintiffs presented evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable
fact finder to infer that individuals that had been exposed to carcinogens and non-
carcinogens had increased their risk of illness beyond the one-in-a-million bench-
mark the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses. See id. at 847-48. Then,
regarding the plaintiffs' claim brought pursuant to CERCLA, the court found that
health risk assessment fees were not "response costs" for purposes of CERCLA. See
id. at 848-49. Lastly, regarding the claim the plaintiffs brought under HSCA, the
Third Circuit concluded that as the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate their need for "special medical monitoring," their claim
would not survive a motion for summary judgment. See id.
68. See id. at 850 n.14. While the Redland federal action did not assert a com-
mon law medical monitoring claim, the Third Circuit nevertheless gave conflicting
signals. The court first stated that "[w] e believe that the elements of a claim for
medical monitoring under CERCLA and HSCA are the same as the elements for a
common law medical monitoring claim set out in Paoli I and Paoli II." Id. at 849
n. 12. Later, however, the Third Circuit stated that "[w] e express no opinion, how-
ever, about any claim for medical monitoring under state law." Id. Nevertheless,
considering its Paoli decisions, it appears that the Third Circuit believes that a
claim for medical monitoring is permissible under Pennsylvania common law. See
id.
[Vol. X: p. 201
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Third Circuit concluded that HSCA's requirements for medical
monitoring were identical to common law claims. 69
III. REDLAND SOCCER CLUB, INC. V. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Between 1917 and 1950, the United States Army used a four-
teen-acre tract of land in Fairview Township, Pennsylvania, as a
dump site for various hazardous wastes. 70 Once the Army closed
the site, Fairview Township assumed ownership of the land.
71
Fairview Township then transformed the site into "Marsh Run
Park," which the Redland plaintiffs used as a recreational facility. 72
Nearly three decades later, the Army returned to Marsh Run Park
to conduct tests to determine whether hazardous wastes re-
mained.73 The Army's findings prompted the Redland plaintiffs to
Further evidence of this proposition was offered by the Third Circuit in In re
Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 113 F.3d 444, 459 (3d Cir. 1997) (Paoli III). In
Paoli III, the Third Circuit held that plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were
exposed to the hazardous substances at levels significantly above their normal
background level to demonstrate a need for medical monitoring under Penn-
sylvania state common law. See id. at 459 (quoting Redland, 55 F.3d at 847).
69. See Redland, 55 F.3d at 827. Because the plaintiffs in Redland did not
demonstrate that they required "special medical monitoring," the Third Circuit
denied their claim. See id.
70. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 139. For HSCA's definition of "hazardous waste,"
see supra note 1.
71. See id. In April of 1987, the Army began testing the park for possible con-
taminants and in August of that year the park was closed in response to prelimi-
nary testing that revealed hazardous substances were indeed present. See id. When
the Army decided to abandon the area, it placed a layer of soil and coal ashes over
the debris on the site. See id. When the Fairview Township later decided to con-
vert the site into a recreational facility, the township added an additional layer of
topsoil. See id.
72. Id. at 140. In the Redland state action, the class of Redland plaintiffs con-
sisted of three groups: (1) children and their family members who participated in
soccer activities in the park; (2) Fairview Township employees who prepared the
park for the Township's use; and (3) residents living near the park and relatives
who regularly visited them. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the
Army, No. 00338HBG94, slip op. at 2, 3 (Pa. Super Ct. 1994). For a more detailed
discussion of the facts of the present action as the Third Circuit presented them in
the Redland federal action, see Redland, 55 F.3d at 827. For a discussion of the
Redland plaintiffs' specific allegations and claims for relief, see infra notes 77-81
and accompanying text.
73. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 139. In 1987, while the Redland Soccer Club was
still using Marsh Run Park, the United States Corps of Engineers performed soil
testing at the former landfill site to determine whether hazardous substances had
contaminated it. See Redland v. Department of Army, 55 F.3d at 835-36. The
testing revealed contamination in most of the soil and sediment samples. See id. at
836. The testing was funded as part of the Defense Environmental Restoration
Account (DERA). See id. The DERA, a program established under 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 2701 et seq., was initiated to investigate and remedy environmental contamina-
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file suit under HSCA because they were previously unaware that
hazardous substances existed at Marsh Run Park.74 The plaintiffs
sought the establishment of a medical monitoring trust fund that
would support their efforts to determine whether they incurred
harm as a result of the exposure to hazardous substances in Marsh
Run Park.75
In 1992, after an initial attempt to bring their case in federal
district court,76 the plaintiffs brought the present action in the
Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania.77 The court
held that although HSCA permits private individuals to assert moni-
toring costs, the Redland plaintiffs failed to submit sufficient evi-
dence of exposure to hazardous materials in Marsh Run Park to
satisfy the burden of proof HSCA imposed.78 On appeal, the super-
74. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 143. The Redland plaintiffs asserted their claim
under HSCA's citizen suit provision, section 1115, seeking a medical monitoring
trust fund and attorneys' fees. See id. The plaintiffs alleged that section 1115's
grant of "equitable powers" to courts enabled the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
grant this relief because a medical monitoring trust fund is a cognizable response
cost under the "Scope of Liability" provision of HSCA, section 702. See id. For the
text of section 1115, see supra note 5.
75. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 137-43.
76. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 801 F. Supp.
1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992). The Redland plaintiffs originally filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in 1990. See Redland
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, No. 1:CV-90-1072 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
After the district court dismissed the federal claim based on its determination that
the Army's actions concerning Marsh Run Park were discretionary and thus subject
to sovereign immunity, the Redland plaintiffs brought suit in the Court of Common
Pleas, York County, Pennsylvania. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of
the Army, 92-SU-05339-01,John C. Uhler, (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 1992). For a discus-
sion of both the federal and state Redland actions, see infra notes 77-81.
In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the claims for medical monitoring, but on grounds dif-
ferent from those upon which the district court decided the case. See Redland
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995) (cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 772 (1996)). The Third Circuit held that although the Redland plaintiffs
presented sufficient evidence of their exposure to toxic substances, they had not
demonstrated their need for "special medical monitoring." See id. Therefore, the
Third Circuit granted the Army's motion for summary judgment. See id.
77. See generally Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 92-SU-
05339-01, John C. Uhler, (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 1992).
78. See id. The plaintiffs relied on a "Public Health Risk Assessment of a Soc-
cer Field Near the New Cumberland Army Depot Fairview Township, [Penn-
sylvania]" which was conducted to assess the extent of contamination at Marsh Run
Park. See id. at 10. The court held that this assessment was "insufficient." See id.
The court further stated:
Mere speculation based on risk assessments and statistical assumptions
should not provide the basis for relief. [P] laintiffs must show actual ex-
posure to the contaminants. The [r]isk [a] ssessment, while useful with
respect to cleanup efforts and preventing exposure to possible contami-
nants in the future, should not provide the basis for liability for alleged
exposure in the past.
24
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ior court reversed the trial court's decision and held that the Red-
land plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to support a claim
under HSCA and that it was necessary for the Redland plaintiffs to
undergo "special medical monitoring. ' 79 Although the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling that
HSCA permits recovery of a medical monitoring trust fund, it also
held that plaintiffs must demonstrate a need for "special medical
monitoring" before it would allow plaintiffs to recover that fund.8 0
Id. at 11.
Further holding that attorneys' fees are not recoverable in citizen suits plain-
tiffs bring under HSCA, the court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. See id. at 16.
79. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, No. 033HBG95
(Pa. Super. 1995). The court did not elaborate on its decision not to adopt the
"special medical monitoring" element, stating only that "the rule is not a necessary
element of a cause of action under [HSCA]." Id. at 12. The superior court also
held that contrary to the lower court's ruling, attorneys' fees are recoverable in a
citizen suit under HSCA. See id.
80. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 139. The Pennsylania Supreme Court granted the
Army's Petition for Allowance of Appeal limited to the issues of "(1) whether pri-
vate plaintiffs must show that they require special medical monitoring to recover
medical monitoring damages as response costs under HSCA, and (2) whether
HSCA authorizes attorney fees for medical monitoring claims." Id. at 140-41. The
Army challenged the superior court's holding that a demonstration of a need for
.special medical monitoring" was unnecessary in a claim for medical monitoring
under HSCA. See Appellant's Brief at 16-17, Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of the Army, 696 A.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1997) (No. 0046) [hereinafter Appel-
lant's Brief]. The Army also contended that HSCA did not provide for medical
monitoring costs as damages at all. See id. at 17. Finally, the Army asserted that
attorney fees were not recoverable in an action for medical monitoring. See id. at
17-18.
The Redland plaintiffs argued that the supreme court should adopt the supe-
rior court's decision that HSCA does not require demonstration of the element of
.special medical monitoring." See id. at 9. Instead, the Redland plaintiffs claimed
the only appropriate standard is one requiring proof that medical testing is reason-
ably necessary under contemporary scientific principles. See id. at 9. The Redland
plaintiffs further asserted that HSCA permits private individuals to recover attor-
neys' fees. See id.
In its decision, although the supreme court agreed with the Army that a medi-
cal monitoring claim under HSCA requires evidence to support a need for "special
medical monitoring," it also held that attorney fees are recoverable in an action for
medical monitoring. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 147. Central to the court's decision
was its requirement that the plaintiffs demonstrate a need for "special medical
monitoring." See id. at 146. The court defined "special medical monitoring" as
monitoring which is "different [t]han normally recommended in the absence of
the exposure." Id. In reaching its decision, the court held that section 1115 of
HSCA permits courts to grant equitable relief in the form of medical monitoring
fees, which are a cognizable recovery cost under section 702. See id. at 142. In
finding that HSCA permits a claim for medical monitoring when "special monitor-
ing" is necessary, the court held that the elements are the same as a common law
claim for medical monitoring. See id. at 145.
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that HSCA's citizen suit provision au-
thorizes private individuals to assert medical monitoring claims
upon their showing of a need for "special medical monitoring."81
In reaching its decision, the court first determined that HSCA's citi-
zen suit provision authorizes a claim for medical monitoring, and
then proceeded to outline the elements of that claim by drawing
from both Pennsylvania common law as well as several Third Circuit
decisions. 82
A. HSCA's Citizen Suit Provision Authorizes Private Individuals'
Claims for Medical Monitoring
The Redland court began its determination of whether HSCA
permits private individuals to assert claims for medical monitoring
by briefly examining the purposes underlying HSCA.83 The court
noted the General Assembly's belief that "traditional legal remedies
were not adequate" to prevent the release of hazardous substances
into the environment. 84 It also highlighted the General Assembly's
81. See id. "Special medical monitoring" is the need for a medical monitoring
regime that is different than that which would normally be recommended absent
exposure to the hazardous substances. See id. at 145-46. The supreme court
agreed with the superior court's decision that attorney fees were recoverable by
private individuals under HSCA's citizen suit. See id. at 147.
82. See id. at 145. In outlining the elements of a medical monitoring claim,
the court reviewed the following cases: Peterman v. Techalloy Co., 29 Pa. D. & C.3d
104 (Montgomery County Ct. 1982) (holding that Pennsylvania law required ac-
tual injury before permitting recovery); Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants v.
York, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20937 (1985) (holding that plaintiffs alleging injury from
the leakage of toxic substances at landfill could maintain common law claim in
equity for medical monitoring trust fund); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) (Paoli 1) (predicting that although neither Pennsylvania
Supreme Court or Pennsylvania Superior Court had decided issue of medical mon-
itoring, survey of decisions from courts of common pleas, federal district courts in
Pennsylvania, and courts from several other jurisdictions, indicated that Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court would recognize cause of action for medical monitoring);
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (Paoli 1) (refining
Paoli I test); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996) (recognizing medical
monitoring as viable cause of action under Pennsylvania law).
83. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 141.
84. HSCA, § 6020.102(5). The General Assembly stated:
[t] raditional legal remedies have not proved adequate for preventing the
release of hazardous substances into the. environment or for preventing
the contamination of water supplies. ... It is necessary, therefore, to clar-
ify the responsibility of persons who own, possess, control or dispose of
hazardous substances; to provide new remedies to protect the citizens of
this Commonwealth against the release of hazardous substances; and to
assure the replacement of water supplies.
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determination that proper regulation and control of hazardous
substances in Pennsylvania required "extraordinary enforcement
remedies."85
Turning to the language of HSCA, the Redland court found
that although section 702 does not explicitly provide for private in-
dividuals' recovery of medical monitoring, such recovery could be
implied from section 1115.86 The court first noted that section
1115(a) permits individuals to assert claims against parties responsi-
ble for the release of hazardous substances.87 It also highlighted
that section 1115(b) authorizes courts to grant equitable relief to
injured individuals.88 The Redland court then examined section
702(a)(5) to determine the scope of courts' equitable powers
under section 1115(b). 89
85. See id. at § 6020.102(9). The General Assembly commented,
"[e]xtraordinary enforcement remedies and procedures are necessary and appro-
priate to encourage responsible persons to clean up hazardous sites and to deter
persons in possession of hazardous substances from careless or haphazard manage-
ment." Id.
86. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 141-42. The Redland court began its examination
of the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim under HSCA's citizen suit, section
1115. See id. at 141. The following is the pertinent part of the court's analysis:
HSCA makes it unlawful to "[clause or allow a release of a hazardous
substance." Private citizens injured or threatened with injury from the
release of a hazardous substance may bring suit under the citizen suit
provision of HSCA [section 1115]. HSCA imposes liability for certain
remedies related to the release of a hazardous substance [in section 702].
Id. at 141 (citations omitted).
The court noted that the Redland plaintiffs filed their complaint pursuant to
section 6020.1115 and section 6020.702 of HSCA. See id. at 142. It further stated
that the plaintiffs requested equitable relief under section 6020.1115(b) "in the
form of a medical monitoring trust fund, which they claimed is a cognizable re-
sponse cost under section 6020.702(a)." Id. The court then held that although
section 6020.702(a) does not explicitly use the words "medical monitoring trust
fund", the terms "cost of response", "health assessment" and "health effects study"
in section 6020.702(a) encompass a claim for medical monitoring. See id. The
court ultimately concluded that under their interpretation of these terms, that
medical monitoring was recoverable in an action under HSCA's citizen suit provi-
sion and was consistent with the General Assembly's "clearly stated intent 'to pro-
vide new remedies to protect the citizens of this Commonwealth against the
release of hazardous substances.'" Id. (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35
§ 6020.102(5)).
87. SeeHSCA, § 6020.1115(a). For the text of section 1115(a), see supra note
5.
88. See id. Section 1115(b) states, "[t]he court may grant any equitable relief;
may impose a civil penalty under section 1104; and may award litigation costs,
including reasonable attorney and witness fees, to the prevailing or substantially
prevailing party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate." Id.
89. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 142. The Redland court did not elaborate on its
decision to consider section 702 in its determination of the scope of its equitable
powers. See id. The court's reliance on policies illuminates its decision that a re-
quest for medical monitoring damages is an action at equity, rather than at law.
See id. Specifically, the distinction between an action at law, which would require
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In examining section 702(a) (5), the Redland court determined
that although that section refers explicitly only to recovery for the
cost of a "health assessment or health effects study," that recovery
includes a medical monitoring trust fund.90 The court supported
damages, and an equitable action, which would satisfy section 1115 (b), lies in the
distinction between a request for a lump sum award of damages and a trust fund.
See id. at 142 n.6. The court held that a claim for a medical monitoring trust fund
is significantly different from a claim for a lump sum award of damages because a
trust fund only compensates the plaintiff for the monitoring costs he actually in-
curs, whereas damages in the form of a lump sum allows a plaintiff to spend the
money as he sees fit. See id.
The court cited the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Ayers as instruc-
tive. See id. (citing Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (1987)).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that:
We, too, believe that a medical monitoring trust fund is a more appropri-
ate remedy than lump sum damages in mass exposure toxic tort cases.
However, because the Redland Plaintiffs are seeking only a medical moni-
toring trust fund, we offer no opinion concerning whether lump sum
damages are recoverable under HSCA.
Redland, 696 A.2d at 142 n.6.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court commented on the appropriateness of the
trust fund approach:
A claim for a medical monitoring trust fund is significantly different from
a claim for a lump sum award of damages. A trust fund compensates the
plaintiff for only the monitoring costs actually incurred. In contrast, a
lump sum award of damages is exactly that, a monetary award that the
plaintiff can spend as he or she sees fit. Various courts have advocated
the trust fund approach instead of the lump sum approach.
Id.
(citing Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993)
(holding that medical monitoring was proper recovery in light of need to
compensate plaintiffs for economic injury associated with need for peri-
odic medical testing); Ayers v. Township ofJackson, 525 A.2d 287 (1987)
(rejecting enhanced risk of injury approach court held that medical mon-
itoring was proper method of recovery for plaintiffs requiring medical
surveillance following exposure to toxic substances); Bums v. Jaquays
Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that without
actual physical injury plaintiff did not have cause of action but was enti-
tled to costs of medical surveillance)).
90. See id. Although the General Assembly did not define "health assessment"
or "health risk study," it defined "response" for purposes of HSCA as:
Action taken in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance or a contaminant into the environment to study, assess,
prevent, minimize or eliminate the release in order to protect the present
or future public health, safety or welfare or the environment. The term
includes, but is not limited to:
(1) Emergency response to the release of hazardous substances or
contaminants.
(2) Actions at or near the location of the release, such as studies; health
assessments.., monitoring and maintenance reasonably required to
assure that these actions protect the public health, safety, and welfare
and the environment.
(5) Other actions necessary to assess, prevent, minimize or mitigate dam-
age to the public health, safety or welfare or the environment which
28
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its interpretation of "health effects study" in section 702(a) (5) by
reasoning that it was consistent with the General Assembly's stated
intent "to provide new remedies" to protect individuals from the
risks associated with exposure to hazardous substances. 91 After
finding that medical monitoring was a cognizable response cost
under section 702(a) (5), the court permitted the Redland plaintiffs
to bring a citizen suit action under section 1115 (a) and to recover a
medical monitoring trust fund on the basis of its equitable powers
under section 1115(b). 92
B. The Elements of a Medical Monitoring Claim Under HSCA
Following its rationale that section 1115 permits a private indi-
vidual to assert a claim for the recovery of a medical monitoring
trust fund, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court delineated the ele-
ments of such a claim. 93 The supreme court accepted the Third
Circuit's conclusion in the Redland federal action that the elements
of a medical monitoring claim under HSCA are the same as the
elements of a Pennsylvania common law claim for medical monitor-
may otherwise result from a release or threatened release of hazard-
ous substances or contaminants.
HSCA, § 6020.103.
91. Redland, 696 A.2d at 142. The court stated that because a trust fund com-
pensates the plaintiff for only the actual costs associated with periodic medical
testing, it is preferable as a remedy to a lump sum award, which a plaintiff might
use in any manner he decides. See id. at 142 n.6. The court again agreed with the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Ayers, wherein it found that "medical-sur-
veillance damages will be paid only to compensate for medical examinations and
tests actually administered, and will encourage plaintiffs to safeguard their health
by not allowing them the option of spending the money for other purposes." Id.
(citing Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300-05). For a discussion of the effects of the Ayers deci-
sion on claims for medical monitoring, see McCarter, supra note 24.
92. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 142. The court relied on the Ayers court's reason-
ing in finding that "the use of a court-supervised fund to administer medical-sur-
veillance payments in mass exposure cases ... is a highly appropriate exercise of
the Court's equitable powers .... " See id. at n.6 (quoting Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300-
05). The court, however, did not specify why a court supervised fund would qualify
as an equitable remedy. See id. For a discussion of the differing viewpoints con-
cerning the distinction between court supervised funds and lump sum awards, see
supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
93. See id. at 143. For a discussion of the evolution of medical monitoring
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ing.94 Thus, to ascertain these elements, the court examined Penn-
sylvania common law.9 5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court briefly addressed the histori-
cal evolution of medical monitoring in Pennsylvania.96 Initially,
courts rejected such claims because plaintiffs were unable to estab-
lish actual injury.97 Eventually, however, Pennsylvania courts recog-
nized the difficulty inherent in demonstrating a latent injury and
permitted common law claims for medical monitoring to proceed
in equity.98 The court then examined the treatment of this issue in
the Third Circuit's Paoli I, Paoli II and Redland decisions. 99 Unlike
the superior court, the supreme court embraced the element of
"special medical monitoring" the Third Circuit utilized in those de-
cisions. 10 0 The supreme court, however, declined to adopt the spe-
cific test the Third Circuit developed in those cases because "the
nuances added to Paoli I in Paoli II and Redland [made] the verba-
94. See id. at 143-47. In the Redland federal action, the Third Circuit com-
mented in a footnote that a claim for medical monitoring under HSCA is the same
as a common law claim for medical monitoring in Pennsylvania. See Redland, 55
F.3d at 849 n.12. The court reached this conclusion through its decision in Paoli I
and Paoli II. See id. For a discussion of the Paoli I and Paoli II decisions, see supra
notes 60-67.
95. See Redland, 693 A.2d at 143-45.
96. See id. at 143.
97. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 142.
98. See id. at 143-44. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first acknowledged a
claim for medical monitoring in Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996).
See id. at 144. Although Simmons specifically addressed the early detection of injury
due to exposure to asbestos, the Court did not limit its holding to asbestos cases.
See id. at 145. In support of extending the right of medical monitoring beyond
asbestos cases, the Redland court reasoned:
[M]edical surveillance damages promote early diagnosis and treatment of
disease or illness resulting from exposure to toxic substances caused by a
tortfeasor's negligence. Allowing recovery for such expenses avoids the
potential injustice of forcing an economically disadvantaged person to
pay for expensive diagnostic examinations necessitated by another's neg-
ligence. Indeed, in many cases a person will not be able to afford such
tests, and refusing to allow medical monitoring damages would in effect
deny him or her access to potentially life-saving treatment. It also affords
toxic-tort victims, for whom other sorts of recovery may prove difficult,
immediate compensation for medical monitoring needed as a result of
exposure. Additionally, it furthers the deterrent function of the tort sys-
tem by compelling those who expose others to toxic substances to mini-
mize risks and costs of exposure. Allowing such recovery is also in
harmony with "the important public health interest in fostering access to
medical testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic chemicals creates
an enhanced risk of disease."
Id. (citations omitted).
99. See id. at 145. The Third Circuit predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would permit claims for medical monitoring. See id. For a discussion of
these opinions, see supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
100. See id.
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tim adoption of the Paoli I test impractical."'10 1 Instead, the
supreme court determined that to assert a claim for medical moni-
toring, an individual must satisfy each of the following seven
elements:10 2
(1) exposure greater than normal background levels; l03
101. Id. The court did not elaborate on what the term "nuances" entailed.
See id
102. See id. at 145-46. While the Redland court did not adopt the specific ele-
ments that other state and federal courts have applied to claims for medical moni-
toring, it indicated its approval of the Third Circuit's, as well as the NewJersey and
Utah Supreme Courts' formulations. See id.
As only the "special medical monitoring" element was at issue in Redland, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to delineate the scope of
the other elements of its test. See id. at 145-46. Lower Pennsylvania courts will thus
be required to interpret the exact scope and meaning of the elements that remain
undefined.
Counsel involved in either presenting or defending against a medical moni-
toring claim should be aware that expert medical witnesses will be involved in liti-
gation. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at § 2. Medical monitoring claims are
.ultimately dependent" on reliable expert testimony. See generally Burns v. Jacquays
Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). Counsel preparing to settle med-
ical monitoring claims should be aware that inflation is of such obvious concern to
future claimants that parties should address it in all settlement class actions. See
Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions
Seeking Monetary Relief 71 N.Y.U.L. REv. 439, 497 (1996) (highlighting concerns
class action plaintiffs encounter in bringing claims for future harm). One scholar
has proposed the following rule to apply to plaintiffs seeking settlement of their
claims:
In cases providing monetary relief for class members who will suffer inju-
ries in the future, the court may not approve a settlement that does not
make periodic adjustments to take into account increases in the cost of
living, both generally and with respect to subcomponents of the cost of
living for the type of costs for which the monetary relief is provided, un-
less the settling parties show, and the court finds, that there is good cause
why such periodic adjustments should not be made.
Id.
103. The Third Circuit characterized this element as whether or not the
plaintiff has proven "significant exposure" to a hazardous substance. Paoli II, 113
F.3d 444, 459 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the
Army, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995)). "Significant exposure" is exposure to toxins at
levels significantly above the normal background presence. See id. In Paoli III, the
plaintiffs were exposed to PCBs while living nearby a railroad. See id. at 444. The
Third Circuit approved of the following jury instruction in Paoli III:
Each plaintiff must prove through competent expert testimony that he or
she was significantly exposed to PCBs from the Paoli Railyard. The plain-
tiff must prove that PCBs from the Paoli Yard actually entered his or her
body in amounts significantly beyond what would enter a person's body
in everyday life elsewhere in the Philadelphia area and in amounts suffi-
cient to cause the plaintiff to have a risk of future disease significantly
greater than what he or she would have had without exposure.
Id. at 459.
The Utah Supreme Court defined "exposure" in medical monitoring claims to
include: "ingesting, inhaling, injecting, or otherwise absorbing the substance in
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(2) to a proven hazardous substance; 10 4
(3) caused by defendant's negligence; 10 5
(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a
significantly increased risk of contracting a serious la-
tent disease; 106
(5) a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early
detection of the disease possible; 0 7
(6) the prescribed monitoring regime is different from
that normally recommended in the absence of the ex-
posure;108 and
question into the body." Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supp. Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979
(Utah 1993).
104. Section 301 of HSCA defines "hazardous substance" as it applies to a
medical monitoring claim. See HSCA, § 6020.301. Included in HSCA's definition
is any substance (1) designated as "hazardous" under the Solid Waste Management
Act, (2) defined as "hazardous" pursuant to CERCLA, (3) that poses a substantial
threat to the public health and safety or the environment as determined by DEP,
and (4) listed in the regulations of the Environmental Quality Board. See id.
For medical monitoring claims in Pennsylvania that do not qualify for adjudi-
cation under HSCA, the Utah Supreme Court has offered the following definition
of a toxin: a poison, that is, "a substance that through its chemical action usually
kills, injures, or impairs an organism." Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979.
105. In light of HSCA's existence as a strict liability statute, it appears that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in holding that the elements of a claim for medical
monitoring under HSCA are the same as a common law claim for medical moni-
toring, unintentionally included the element of negligence in the test's elements.
See generally HSCA, § 6020.702(a) (stating that "[a] person who is responsible for a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance ... is strictly liable . . ").
One commentator suggests that in an action for medical monitoring under HSCA,
plaintiffs may establish negligence per se. See Danielle N. Rodier, Supreme Court
Allows Monitoring Fees, PA. L. WKLY, June 7, 1997, at 30. Pennsylvania cases decided
under the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law and Solid Waste Management Act,
however, suggest that negligence per se does not apply. See generally Fleck v. Tim-
mons, 543 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Lutz v. Chromotex, Inc., 718 F. Supp.
413, 426-30 (M.D. Pa. Ct. 1989). But see generally Centolanza v. Lehigh, 755 A.2d
322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (suggesting that negligence per se might apply).
106. The Utah Supreme Court has commented on the element of "signifi-
cantly increased risk of injury." Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979. The court stated:
No particular level of quantification is necessary to satisfy this require-
ment of significantly increased risk .... Because the injury in question is
the increase in risk that requires one to incur the cost of monitoring, the
plaintiff need not prove that he or she has a probability of actually exper-
iencing the toxic consequence of the exposure. It is sufficient that the
plaintiff show the requisite increased risk.
Id. at 979. Moreover, the Hansen court defined a "serious" illness as one that in "its
ordinary course may result in significant impairment or death." Id.
107. The Utah Supreme Court also requires that a test exist for detecting the
injury. See id. If no test exists, then monitoring is pointless and the plaintiff is not
harmed until the onset of the actual illness. See id. Only when a test is developed,
or an actual injury manifests itself, may a plaintiff bring an action for medical mon-
itoring. See id.
108. The Third Circuit appears to consider elements (1), "significant expo-
sure," and (6), the "special medical monitoring" requirement, to be complimen-
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(7) the prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably nec-
essary according to contemporary scientific
principles. 10 9
The sixth element, the "special medical monitoring" requirement,
was the sole element at issue in Redland.11 ° After concluding that
the plaintiffs satisfied this element, the court determined that the
Redland plaintiffs could assert a claim for medical monitoring.111
tary. See Paoli III, 113 F.3d 444, 461 (3d Cir. 1997). The Paoli court stated, "[o] nly
by requiring a plaintiff to show significant exposure ... can a court ensure that the
plaintiff suffers a need for medical monitoring that is greater than that required by
all other persons." Id.
109. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 145-46. Regarding this element, the Utah
Supreme Court has commented:
We therefore require not only that a doctor prescribe the test for th[e]
plaintiff, but also that the test is shown by expert testimony to be one a
reasonable physician in the area of specialty would order for a patient
similarly situated, i.e., facing a similar risk of the same serious illness from
the same cause.
Hansen, 858 P.2d at 980.
The California Supreme Court similarly requires that a plaintiff prove the cost
of medical monitoring to be a reasonably certain consequence of his exposure to
hazardous substances and the recommended monitoring be reasonable. See gener-
ally Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993). In deter-
mining the reasonableness and necessity of monitoring, the following factors are
relevant:
(1) the significance and extent of the plaintiffs exposure to chemicals;
(2) the toxicity of the chemicals; (3) the relative increase in the chance
of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the exposure,
when compared to (a) the plaintiffs chances of developing the disease
had he or she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of
the public at large of developing the disease; (4) the seriousness of the
disease for which the plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the clinical value of early
detection and diagnosis.
Id.
110. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 146.
111. See id. at 146-47. The court based its conclusion that the Redland plain-
tiffs satisfied the element of "special monitoring" on their doctor's prescription of
a monitoring regime that was "[s]ignificantly different from that normally recom-
mended in the absence of exposure .... " Id. at 147. The controversy surrounding
this issue stemmed from the plaintiffs' doctor's comments regarding the monitor-
ing regime:
I emphasize, as well, that the examinations suggested... are not out of
the ordinary, but consist of the usual adult medical examinations recom-
mended for all adults with the adult risk of cancer in our society from
those carcinogen exposures which are already prevalent. It is because of
the increased risk of the exposures at the Marsh Run area, however, that
such examinations become more urgent, and access to such examina-
tions should not be left to vicissitudes of employment, health insurance
contract, or other individual economic difficulties so prevalent in current
health care delivery.
Id. at 146. When the Third Circuit in the Redland federal action addressed the
questions the plaintiffs' doctor's statements raised, it concluded that as the moni-
toring regime she recommended was not out of the ordinary, the plaintiffs could
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The court therefore declined to grant defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment because the difference between plaintiffs' monitor-
ing regime and the regime normally recommended in the absence
of exposure to hazardous substances sufficed to support a claim for
special medical monitoring.112
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Redland, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that HSCA
section 1115 authorizes claims for medical monitoring.113 Medical
monitoring, however, is not an appropriate citizen suit action be-
cause such an action seeks recovery of private damages. 114 Conse-
quently, the Redland plaintiffs should have instead asserted their
not satisfy the "special monitoring" requirement. See Redland Soccer Club v. De-
partment of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 847-48 (3d Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court
also noted that the Army's own medical expert had reviewed the plaintiffs' doctor's
report and found that it differed from the procedures doctors normally recom-
mended to individuals that have been exposed to the toxic substances found in the
American Cancer Society's "Recommendations for the Early Detection of Cancer
in Asymptomatic People." See Redland, 696 A.2d at 146-47. Acknowledging the
inconsistencies of the plaintiffs' doctor's report, the court held that, viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, her monitoring regime differed sufficiently
from one that would be prescribed to a member of the general public absent the
exposure to withstand a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 147.
112. See id. After the court briefly addressed the Redland plaintiffs' second
claim for the recovery of attorneys' fees under HSCA, the court held that because
section 1115 is the only HSCA provision that authorizes citizen suits, and permits
the recovery of attorneys' fees, a plaintiff can recover attorneys' fees even when
receiving relief from another section of the Act. See id.
113. See id. at 137-40. For the facts of Redland, see supra notes 70-80 and ac-
companying text.
114. See, e.g., Peterman v Techalloy Co., 29 Pa. D. & C. 3d 104 (1982); Ball v.
Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36, 38 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding medical monitor-
ing is claim for damages); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 1979)
(stating plaintiff cannot transform claim for damages into equitable action by ask-
ing for injunction that orders payment of money); Castano v. American Tobacco
Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 552 (E.D. La. 1991) (declining to certify plaintiffs' claims for
medical monitoring of diseases related to exposure to tobacco under Rule
23(b) (2) because plaintiffs primarily sought monetary damages, not equitable re-
lief). But see Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 989 F. Supp. 661, 665 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (holding if plaintiffs seek establishment of court-supervised medical moni-
toring program through which class members will receive periodic examinations,
court can properly characterize plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim as claim seek-
ing injunctive relief); Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
746 F.2d 816, 824-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding equitable remedy of providing diag-
nostic examinations preferable to post-trial award of damages); Barth v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (upholding employee's
request for "equitable relief" through which he sought creation of medical moni-
toring fund which would gather and forward to treating physicians information
relating to diagnosis of diseases which might result from plaintiff's exposure to
toxins while employed at defendant's tire manufacturing facility). The Barth court
explained, in sustaining the plaintiffs claim for equitable relief, that but for its
creation of a fund that would locate exposed workers and aid in the early diagnosis
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claim under section 702.115 Whereas section 1115 explicitly permits
courts to award attorneys' fees, section 702 does not.11 6 Accord-
ingly, the Redland court's desire to award both attorneys' fees and
medical monitoring to a class of sympathetic plaintiffs drove its de-
cision.11 7 Essentially, the supreme court decided Redland incor-
of diseases they might potentially develop, most employees would never know that
they had been exposed to toxins. See id.
115. In the Redland federal action, the plaintiffs' claim for medical monitor-
ing was characterized as an action for personal damages rather than as a proper
matter for a citizen suit. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army,
801 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 (M.D. Pa. 1992). The district court noted that the plain-
tiffs should have asserted their claim under section 702. See id. In response to the
plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees, the district court stated:
Plaintiffs also make their requests for attorney fees and expert fees under
HSCA .... The language of that statute does not support plaintiffs' inter-
pretation. The relevant section, § 6020.702(a), allows recovery of "(3)
Other reasonable and necessary or appropriate cost of response incurred
by any other person." Courts have implied a private cause of action from
this provision .... It is clear, however, that private recovery is allowed only for
"costs of response...." No language in that definition.., lends credibility
to plaintiffs claim for attorney fees. Further, HSCA expressly allows the
Commonwealth to recover attorney fees .. . . Certainly, had it so in-
tended, the legislature could have included a legal fee provision for pri-
vate suits. It did not and we will not imply one.
Id. at 1436 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
116. See generally HSCA, § 6020. Section 1115(b) provides, "[t]he court may
... award litigation costs, including reasonable attorney and witness fees, to the
prevailing or substantially prevailing party whenever the court determines such an
award is appropriate." See HSCA, § 6020.1115(b). Section 702 contains no lan-
guage authorizing attorney fees. See id. § 702.
117. See Arvin Maskin & Peter A. Antonucci, New Theories of Liability in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 30 CHEM. WASTE LrnG. REP. 1101 (Nov. 1995) (noting recent shift
toward courts' acceptance of medical monitoring claims); Allan Kanner, Environ-
mental Justice, Torts and Causation, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 505, 507 (1995) (suggesting
claims for medical monitoring appear to be gaining acceptance as interim mea-
sure of relief for victims at elevated risk of future injury); Adam P. Rosen, Com-
ment, Emotional Distress Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation: The Move Towards
Foreseeablitity, 3 ViLE. ENVTL. L.J. 113, 147 (1992) (commenting recovery for costs of
medical monitoring is gaining rapidly increasing acceptance in toxic tort cases).
Compare Kristin Bohlken, Note, Fitting the Square Peg of Alternative Toxic Tort Remedies
into the Round Hole of Traditional Tort Law, 1 DRAKE J. AGrc. L. 263 (1996) (com-
menting analysis of medical monitoring case law illustrates not only courts' slow
acceptance of alternative tort theory, but also reasoning for doing so).
Although there exists only a limited number of Pennsylvania state court deci-
sions involving medical monitoring, the Third Circuit has applied Pennsylvania law
prominently in the move toward acceptance of the claim. See generally Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig. v. SEPTA, 113 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 1997); Redland Soccer Club, Inc.
v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995); Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.
v. SEPTA, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994); Arch v. American Tobacco Co.,
175 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Hines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262 (3d
Cir. 1991); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 1992 WL 323531 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
Cherico v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 758 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
In its Paoli decisions, the Third Circuit predicted that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would adopt medical monitoring as a viable cause of action. See In
re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849 (3d. Cir. 1990). For a further
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rectly because it allowed the Redland plaintiffs to forego the
prerequisites of section 1115(a) and thereby unjustifiably benefit
from the equitable powers under section 1115(b). 118
A. The Redland Court Improperly Held That Plaintiffs May
Assert a Claim for Medical Monitoring Under HSCA's
"Citizen Suit" Provision, Section 1115
Section 1115(a), HSCA's "citizen suit" provision, requires
plaintiffs to file a civil action to "prevent or abate a violation of
HSCA."119 A claim for medical monitoring does not, however, "pre-
discussion of Paoli I, see supra note 60 and accompanying text. However, their
prediction was at common law. See id. Faced with pressure from both academics
and other jurisdictions that had already accepted claims for medical monitoring,
as well as with the prospect of denying a class of sympathetic plaintiffs a remedy for
their exposure to hazardous substances, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to
acknowledge that it was not dealing with a common law claim for medical monitor-
ing but rather with a Pennsylvania state statutory provision.
118. In the court's opinion, there is no attempt to reconcile the Redland plain-
tiffs claim with the language of section 1115. In Redland, since this was the first
time that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had decided the issue of medical moni-
toring under HSCA, it seems that, at the least, the court missed the opportunity to
clearly demonstrate how a claim for medical monitoring "abates a violation" of
HSCA and then falls within the court's equitable powers. Given the debate over
whether actions for medical monitoring are either legal or equitable in nature, the
court should have clarified its position on this issue as well. For a discussion of this
debate, see supra note 24-28 and accompanying text.
Concerning the supreme court's support for its award of attorney fees to the
Redland plaintiffs, the following is the court's entire analysis:
Section 6020.1115 is the only section of HSCA that authorizes citizen
suits, and thus, it is the only section under which the Redland Plaintiffs
could have brought suit. Section 6020.702 specifies various categories of
relief for which a defendant may be liable under HSCA. A plaintiff can-
not bring a citizen suit under section 6020.702. Instead, a plaintiff must
bring a citizen suit under section 6020.1115 and may seek the relief avail-
able to private plaintiffs included in section 6020.702, which, as previ-
ously discussed, encompasses a medical monitoring trust fund. Although
section 6020.702 is silent concerning attorney fees, section 6020.1115(b)
explicitly empowers a court to award attorney fees to the prevailing or
substantially prevailing party if the court determines that such an award is
appropriate. Thus, a plaintiff filing a citizen suit under section
6020.1115, seeking equitable relief in the form of a medical monitoring
trust fund under section 6020.702, can also seek attorney fees under sec-
tion 6020.1115.
Redland, 696 A.2d at 147. The court's reasoning offers little to illuminate how a
medical monitoring claim, one that is essentially requesting a set amount of dam-
ages from the defendant to be paid into a court supervised fund, satisfies section
1115(b).
119. See HSCA, § 6020.1115(a). In the context of HSCA's citizen suit provi-
sion, the public's right to force responsible persons to clean up hazardous sites is
at issue. See id. § 102. Because a citizen suit must be an action to "prevent or abate
a violation" of HSCA, it is important to determine what constitutes a "violation"
under HSCA. See Hyson, supra note 6, at 101. Although HSCA does not define
"violation," section 1108 does define "unlawful conduct." See id. Under section
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vent or abate a violation of HSCA."' 20 The Redland plaintiffs were
not interested in abating a violation of HSCA because the Army was
already working to restore Marsh Run Park in an attempt to comply
with HSCA provisions. 121 Instead, the Redland plaintiffs asserted
their claim to recover personal injury damages to pay for the costs
of periodic medical examinations. 122 A citizen suit is not a mecha-
nism for private recovery of personal injury damages, 23 but is
1108(1) of the Act, it is unlawful for a person to "[c]ause or allow a release of a
hazardous substance." HSCA, § 6020.1108(1). Therefore, a "release" is a violation
of HSCA. See Hyson, supra note 6, at 101.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently assumed that medical monitor-
ing "abates a release." It is not immediately evident, however, how medical moni-
toring abates a release, especially within the context of a citizen suit. The remedies
available in citizen suits are almost always in the form of injunctions or civil penal-
ties. See PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 1. Moreover, while the General Assembly
did not define "abatement" for purposes of HSCA, it did define "abatement" for
purposes of SWMA. See HSCA, § 6018.103. For purposes of SWMA, "abatement" is
"[the restoration, reclamation, recovery, etc., of a natural resource adversely af-
fected by the activity of a person, permittee or municipality." Id. Without an indi-
cation from the General Assembly that private damages were recoverable under
HSCA's citizen suit, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not at liberty to grant
this recovery.
120. Redland, 696 A.2d at 141. The Redland court analyzed this issue by hold-
ing that "[p]rivate citizens injured or threatened with injury from the release of a
hazardous substance may bring suit under the citizen suit provision of HSCA." Id.
However, this only addresses the initial requirement of section 1115(a). In its en-
tirety, section 1115(a) provides that:
A person who has experienced or is threatened with personal injury or
property damage as a result of a release of a hazardous substance may file
a civil action against any person to prevent or abate a violation of this act or of
any order, regulation, standard or approval issued under this act.
HSCA, § 6020.1115(a) (emphasis added). Although section 1115(a) allows plain-
tiffs to bring a suit when they have suffered injury, it also requires that the plain-
tiffs' action is brought to prevent or abate a violation of HSCA. By not addressing
this concern, the court overlooked a fundamental aspect of section 1115(a).
121. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 139. After testing determined that there existed
hazardous substances at Marsh Run Park, the Army initiated a program to remedi-
ate the contamination. See id.
122. For a proposal that medical monitoring claims are, in actuality, little
more than plaintiffs' requests for damages, see supra notes 81-85 and accompany-
ing text.
123. See PA. BAR INST., supra note 4, at 1. There exists some indication that
the General Assembly did not intend for plaintiffs bringing claims under HSCA to
be able to recover even private damages. See H.B. 1852-3428, at 41-42, Printer's
No. 3428, § 509. [37 House Legislative Journal at 991-1039.]. A version of HSCA
that would have explicitly provided for private injury damages was deleted in the
final version. See id.
Citizen suit provisions occasionally permit recovery for personal injury dam-
ages. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 680.15(c) (Storm Water Management Act
[SWMA]). Notably, in the instances in which the General Assembly allowed pri-
vate individuals to file citizen suits to recover personal injury damages, they have
also authorized equitable remedies and explicitly provided for personal injury
damages. See id. The SWMA citizen suit provision explicitly provides:
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designed to enable private individuals to enforce public rights. 124
Moreover, in the Redland federal action, the Third Circuit did not
identify the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim as an action under
section 1115, but as an action for "response costs" in the form of
"health risk assessment fees," which plaintiffs may recover under
section 702.125 Therefore, the Redland plaintiffs' claim failed to sat-
isfy the requirements of section 1115(a). 126
The Redland plaintiffs' claim also failed to satisfy the require-
ments of section 1115(b) because their claim for personal injury
damages fell outside the scope of the equitable remedies, civil pen-
alties and litigation costs that are available as judicial remedies
under section 1115(b). 127 In Redland, the court held that it would
place any medical monitoring award in a court-supervised fund
rather than distribute it to the plaintiffs as a lump sum, characteriz-
ing the monetary award as equitable rather than legal damages. 128
Nevertheless, medical monitoring in either form is no different
(a) Any activity conducted in violation of the provisions of this act or of
any watershed storm water plan, regulations or ordinances adopted
hereunder, is hereby declared a public nuisance.
(b) Suits to restrain, prevent or abate violation of this act or of any watershed
storm water plan, regulations or ordinances adopted hereunder, may
be instituted in equity or at law by the department, any affected county
or municipality, or any aggrieved person. Except in cases of emer-
gency where, in the opinion of the court, the circumstances of the
case require immediate abatement of the unlawful conduct, the
court may, in its decree, fix a reasonable time during which the per-
son responsible for the unlawful conduct shall correct or abate the
same. The expense of such proceedings shall be recoverable from
the violator in such manner as may now or hereafter be provided by
law.
(c) Any person injured by conduct which violates the provisions of section 13 may,
in addition to any other remedy provided under this act, recover dam-
ages caused by such violation from the landowner or other responsible person.
Id. (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, SWMA's allowance for private recovery is a highly unique fea-
ture in Pennsylvania citizen suit provisions. See generally, The Storage Tank and
Spill Prevention Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.1305 (West 1993); Safe Drinking
Water Act, § 721.13(b); Phosphate Detergent Act, § 723 .13(g); Storm Water Man-
agement Act, § 680.15; Flood Plain Management Act, § 679.502(b).
124. See PA. BAR. INST., supra note 4, at 1. For a general discussion of the
purposes of citizen suits, see supra note 7.
125. See Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d at 849 n.12.
126. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 139-48.
127. See HSCA, § 6020.1115(a), (b). For a non-exhaustive list ofjurisdictions
that have held that medical monitoring claims are actions for damages, see supra
note 26. For a non-exhaustive list ofjurisdictions that have held that medical mon-
itoring damages in the form of a court supervised fund are equitable in nature, see
supra note 24.
128. For a discussion of the Redland court's reasoning, see supra notes 81-112
and accompanying text.
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from a traditional damages claim for medical expenses.' 29 Rather
than pay the damages award directly to the plaintiff, the defendant
merely places the money into a court-supervised account.1 30
In further support of its holding, the supreme court cited
HSCA's intent "to provide new remedies" to protect Pennsylvania
citizens against the release of hazardous substances. 13' Policy argu-
ments, however, are not a substitute for rigorous statutory analysis.
By passing HSCA, the General Assembly accomplished its goal of
"providing new remedies." The General Assembly did not intend
this general policy to act as a waiver of express statutory
language. 132
B. The Redland Court Should Have Analyzed the Medical
Monitoring Claim Under HSCA's "Scope of Liability"
Provision, Section 702
In determining whether medical monitoring is available under
HSCA, the supreme court should have analyzed the Redland plain-
tiffs' claim under section 1101 rather than under section 1115.133
129. See generally Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.
1991) (stating that "[a] claim for medical surveillance costs is simply a claim for
future damages").
130. See Ian Gallagher, Hazardous Substance Litigation in Mayland: Theories of
Recovery and Proof of Causation, 13J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 423, 438 (1997)
(commenting most state courts considering medical monitoring issue have ana-
lyzed recovery in terms of legal measure of damages); Campbell & Schaffer, supra
note 26, at 31-32 (noting most courts first conclude that medical monitoring relief
is simply compensation for necessary medical expenses plaintiffs reasonably will
incur in future and classify those costs as item of damages). See also Werlein v.
United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 895 (D. Minn. 1990) (stating that "[p]ayment of
cash by one party to reimburse other parties for costs incurred is not injunctive
relief"). But see Terry Christovich Gay & Paige Freeman Rosato, Combating Fear of
Future Injury and Medical Monitoring Claims, 61 DEF. COUNS.J. 554, 554 (1994) (sug-
gesting courts consider medical monitoring to be equitable relief).
131. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 142. The General Assembly's stated purpose in
enacting HSCA was "to provide new remedies to protect the citizens of this Com-
monwealth against the release of hazardous substances .... " HSCA,
§ 6020.102(5).
132. Section 1115(a) requires a person seeking relief under HSCA's citizen
suit to file an action to "abate a violation" of HSCA. See HSCA § 6020.1115(a).
The court apparently interpreted the Redland plaintiffs claim for medical monitor-
ing as a "new remedy" that "abates a violation" of HSCA. See id. It is difficult to
imagine that the General Assembly determined that Pennsylvania courts were free
to graft any and all "new remedies" into the provisions of HSCA as they should
develop. See id.
133. See HSCA, § 6020.1101. Section 1101 provides:
[a] release of a hazardous substance or a violation of any provision, regu-
lation, order or response approved by the department under this act shall
constitute a public nuisance. Any person allowing such a release or com-
mitting such a violation shall be liable for the response costs caused by
the release or the violation. The board and any court of competentjuris-
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Section 1101 places liability on persons responsible for releases of
hazardous substances.134 Section 702 delineates the scope of liabil-
ity for these responsible persons. 135 As HSCA's "Scope of Liability"
provision, section 702 is not encumbered by the same restrictions
that a claim under HSCA's citizen suit provision necessarily en-
tails. 136 Section 702 does not require a plaintiff seeking recovery to
assert a claim for the abatement of a release of hazardous sub-
diction is hereby given jurisdiction over actions to recover the response
costs.
Id. For the text of section 1115, see supra note 5.
134. See id. Prior to Redland, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
HSCA permits a private right of action. See Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1221
(Pa. Super. 1995). Similarly, the District Court for the Middle Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that private damages are recoverable under HSCA. See Bethle-
hem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221, 225-26 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (holding no provision of HSCA permits recovery for private damages). The
district court required that the plaintiff in Bethlehem Iron Works first establish that
the defendant was a "responsible person" under section 701, and then demon-
strate that the recovery requested was a response cost under section 702. See id. See
generally Recent Developments In Pennsylvania Law, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 553, 620 (1996)
(noting Pennsylvania courts have held that section 1101 in combination with sec-
tion 702 permits private cause of action).
135. See HSCA, § 6020.702. In interpreting HSCA, not all federal and Penn-
sylvania state courts have agreed that a private right of action exists under section
702. See generally Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 1990 WL 52745 at *17-18 (E.D.
Pa. April 23, 1990); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1328, 1330-33 (M.D. Pa.
1990) (Lutz III); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 258, 263-65 (M.D. Pa.
1989) (Lutz I1).
Recent decisions in which courts consider whether a private cause of action
exists under HSCA have tended to find that a private cause of action does exist
under HSCA. See generally Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Pa. Super. 1995);
Bethlehem Iron Works, 891 F. Supp. at 225-26.
Generally, the courts in those cases relied on: (1) the language of HSCA sec-
tion 702(a) (3), which provides for recovery of response costs "incurred by any
other person;" (2) parallel provisions of CERCLA, which courts have interpreted
as providing for a private right of action; and (3) the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources' interpretation of section 702(a), which supports the
finding of a private right of action. See generally Smith, 665 A.2d at 1220; Toole v.
Gould, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 985, 992 (M.D. Pa. 1991); General Elec. Envtl. Services v.
Envirotech, Corp., 763 F. Supp. 113, 115-21 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
In the Redland federal action, the district court found that HSCA, section
702 (a) (3), authorized a private cause of action for response costs and that section
702(a) (5) provided for the recovery of medical monitoring damages. Redland, 835
F. Supp. at 803. The Third Circuit did not reach these issues because it found that
1) the Redland plaintiffs failed to introduce sufficient evidence of exposure to haz-
ardous waste to survive a motion for summary judgment on their Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA) medical monitoring claim, and 2) the elements for a medical
monitoring claim were the same under HSCA as under the FTCA. See Redland
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 849 n.12 (3d Cir. 1995).
136. See HSCA, § 6020.1115(a). As a prerequisite to suit, section 1115(a) re-
quires that an injured plaintiff bring an action to abate the release of a hazardous
substance before he may compel a regulated entity to comply with the regulations
of HSCA. See id. Section 702 holds responsible persons strictly liable for the costs
stemming from the release of the hazardous substance. See id. § 702. A plaintiff
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stances.1 3 7 Instead, after a release occurs, a plaintiff may recover
for the damages associated with that release.138 While section 1115
focuses on compelling a regulated entity to comply with the provi-
sions of HSCA, section 702 permits recovery for the effects that re-
sult from non-compliance with HSCA.1
3 9
One category of recovery under section 702 is response costs
associated with the "cost of a health assessment or health affects
study."140 Because the Redland plaintiffs would have been able to
attain relief under this section, the supreme court should have fo-
cused its analysis on this section.
14 1
Moreover, HSCA does not bar plaintiffs from seeking remedies
either at law or equity.142 Even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided that HSCA does not authorize a private right of action,
which is an unlikely proposition given its holding, it could have per-
mitted the Redland plaintiffs to proceed with a common law claim
for medical monitoring.143 Under this approach, however, the
plaintiffs would not have recovered attorneys' fees.
144
may prevail under section 702 by simply establishing that he has suffered an injury
as a result of a release of a hazardous substance. See id.
137. See id. Pennsylvania courts have interpreted section 702 as providing a
separate cause of action although it requires only a demonstration of injury. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. If the General Assembly had intended (in actions brought under
HSCA's citizen suit provision) to permit recovery for all cognizable recoveries
throughout HSCA, it would have had no purpose in enacting the citizen suit provi-
sion. See Hyson, supra note 6, at 100. By placing an attorneys' fee provision in
section 702, the General Assembly could have avoided forcing citizen suits to pro-
ceed via section 1115. See id.
140. HSCA, § 6020.702(a). This section provides that a responsible person "is
strictly liable for the following response costs and damages which result from the
release or threatened release or to which the release or threatened release signifi-
cantly contributes... [t] he cost of a health assessment or health effects study." Id.
141. For a discussion of the term "health affects study" and how Pennsylvania
courts have interpreted it, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
142. See HSCA, § 6020.1107. Section 1107 provides that "[n]othing con-
tained in this act shall abridge or alter rights of action or remedies at law or in
equity." Id.
143. See id. The Redland court's possible hesitancy to proceed under section
702 did not necessitate its employment of section 1115, or even HSCA at all. It was
therefore unnecessary for the court to distort the purposes of HSCA in order to
provide the remedy that the plaintiffs sought. The plaintiffs could have simply
filed their claim for medical monitoring under a negligence or nuisance action at
common law. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 143. As the Redland decision demonstrates,
the court was already prepared to acknowledge a common law claim for medical
monitoring. See id. Of course, this approach would not permit the recovery of
attorney fees.
144. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 1726(a)(1) (West 1993). In Pennsylvania, the
"American Rule" is embodied in section 1726(a) (1), which provides that absent
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VI. IMPACT
As a result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Redland, Pennsylvania residents may now recover medical monitor-
ing costs under both the common law and HSCA.145 Plaintiffs pur-
suing actions under HSCA have the additional incentive of the
potential for attorneys' fees.146 Pennsylvania courts are responsible
for developing the scope of the Redland test for medical monitoring
and, in light of Redland, it appears they may interpret the Redland
elements broadly in the interest of effectuating the General Assem-
bly's intent to "provide new remedies."147
Broad judicial interpretation of HSCA will provide plaintiffs
considerable latitude when attempting to satisfy the Redland test.148
Plaintiffs that have been exposed to hazardous substances will en-
counter few impediments when asserting medical monitoring
claims in Pennsylvania. For instance, the Redland court found that
the plaintiffs satisfied the "special medical monitoring" require-
ment, even after their own doctor concluded that the recom-
mended tests were "not out of the ordinary."149 Although the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the need for "spe-
145. After Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996), some doubt existed
regarding whether claims for medical monitoring would apply only in actions in-
volving asbestos exposure. See M&M Realty Co. v. Eberton Terminal Corp., 977 F.
Supp. 683 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (noting Simmons decision might not apply to other
causes of action). In Redland, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that medical
monitoring actions were not limited to asbestos cases and that, instead, courts
would determine whether a certain factual situation qualified for medical monitor-
ing under the test the court outlined in Redland. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 143. The
court also extended medical monitoring to suits under HSCA. See id.
146. See Ross Macfarlane & Lori Taylor, Citizen Suits: Impacts on Permitting and
Agency Enforcement, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENvr.J. 4, 20 (1997) (noting tremendous
size of many toxic tort awards and discussing rationale behind awarding attorneys'
fees).
147. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided against the whole-
sale adoption of the tests the Third Circuit or other state courts advanced, counsel
bringing medical monitoring claims in Pennsylvania, as well as in other jurisdic-
tions, should look to these decisions to determine the scope of the elements neces-
sary to prove claims for medical monitoring.
148. For instance, in Redland, to determine whether particular diagnostic ex-
aminations satisfied the element of "special medical monitoring," the court relied
on a standard the American Cancer Society supplied. See Redland, 696 A.2d at 146.
The court, however, did not state why it applied that particular standard. See id.
149. Redland, 696 A.2d at 146. Although the Redland court was clearly sympa-
thetic to the plaintiffs' claim, one commentator suggests that the requirement that
plaintiffs demonstrate the elements of a medical monitoring claim will likely allay
concerns that medical monitoring claims will result in a multitude of lawsuits. See
Schwartz, supra note 21, at § 2. See also Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d
569, 574 (Cal. App. Dist. 1993) (commenting courts' "decision to permit medical
monitoring" neither eliminates plaintiffs obligation to prove all elements of his
cause of action or to demonstrate reasonable necessity of medical monitoring).
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cial medical monitoring" may produce a just result under the com-
mon law, in light of HSCA's language, the court should have left
this determination to the General Assembly.
State legislatures in other jurisdictions should recognize that,
because they may not have contemplated medical monitoring as a
valid cause of action when enacting state environmental statutes,
these statutes may act as a bar to recovery. Medical monitoring is a
highly appropriate means of compensating plaintiffs for the costs of
periodic medical examinations associated with exposure to hazard-
ous substances. 150  The common law in many jurisdictions has
evolved to meet the peculiar challenges facing the toxic tort victim
and state legislatures should not hesitate to follow their lead. 15 1
Craig A. Stevens
150. See Wells, supra note 23, at 305. Many commentators express their sup-
port for medical monitoring. See Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND.
L. REv. 1 (1993) (arguing that certain states could adopt strict liability, outlaw
regulatory compliance defenses and insist on use of medical monitoring and prob-
abilistic causation in environmental tort cases); Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical Moni-
toring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic
Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (1992) (commenting courts' uniform rec-
ognition of medical monitoring would encourage healing of injuries individuals
incur as a result of unwitting exposure to hazardous substances); Dan A. Tanen-
baum, When Does Going to the Doctor Serve the Public Health? Medical Monitoring Re-
sponse Costs Under CERCLA, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 925 (1992) (advocating use of
private suits for medical monitoring costs as important tool for private litigants);
Kathleen A. O'Nan, The Challenge of Latent Physical Effects of Toxic Substances: The
Next Step in the Evolution of Toxic Torts, 7 J. MIN. L. & POL'V 227, 241-47 (1991)
(stating judicial acceptance of medical monitoring reflects courts' understanding
that such surveillance is critical to early detection of latent effects of toxic expo-
sure); Allan Kanner, Medical Monitoring: State and Federal Perspectives, 2 TUL. ENVrL.
L.J. 1, 14 (1989) (anticipating courts increasingly will recognize medical monitor-
ing claims). But see Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical
Monitoring: Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 121, 143 (commenting
on dangers associated with medical monitoring claims and suggesting alternative
to medical monitoring).
151. See Laratta Paszamant, supra note 24, at 103-04 (acknowledging, although
long latency periods associated with many diseases resulting from contact with haz-
ardous substances may frustrate many traditional tort principles of recovery, com-
mon law is still able to evolve to meet plaintiffs' needs).
1999] 243
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